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Introduction 
 
1) Synopsis and aim of the research 
 
On the morning of 6 December 1921 the ―Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between 
Great Britain and Ireland‖ were signed between the British government and 
representatives of Dáil Éireann, the newly formed (and self-proclaimed) Irish parliament. 
The agreement was the result of two months of intense debate and deliberation over 
Ireland‘s future relationship with Great Britain, and it was hoped that it would herald an 
end to Anglo-Irish discontent and the ruinous fighting that had dogged Ireland since the 
outbreak of major hostilities in 1919. The signing of the Treaty was a watershed moment; 
for the first time in over seven hundred years the Irish were given the right to self-govern 
and the British obliged to withdraw their physical presence. Yet rather than bring peace, 
the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty would lead Ireland on the path to civil war. The divide that 
would entrench ordinary Irishmen was mirrored by their political representatives, of 
whom the four most significant were Eamon de Valera, Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith 
and Cathal Brugha. The leading question of this paper is twofold: firstly to ascertain what 
their personal views were regarding Ireland‘s future and secondly how closely did their 
views match those of the Irish public? By looking at these four figures, the aim is to try 
and explain whether their differences of opinion helped to sow the seeds of civil war. The 
decision to focus on these particular individuals is due to the fact that they were the most 
instrumental in how the Treaty was received back in Ireland. The polarisation of their 
views, with Griffith and Collins in support of the agreement and de Valera and Brugha 
against, would later be reflected by the two opposing sides that fought the civil war. 
 
2) Overall historiography 
 
This work will look at four very contrasting politicians. As Sheila Lawlor points out, the 
difficulty in asserting precisely what these figures thought at the time about peace 
proposals and settlements ‗arises not only out of the shortage of contemporary written 
evidence, but out of the many and contradictory accounts adopted subsequently by
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protagonists and antagonists of the treaty‘.1 The treaty negotiations of late 1921 and the 
subsequent debates have already been the subject of previous research. Where this paper 
seeks to contribute to the debate is to look at what de Valera, Collins, Griffith and Brugha 
personally sought to achieve for a future Ireland and how this compared to what was 
actually achieved by the agreement. Did the men‘s public comments regarding the 
country‘s future differ at all from what they pragmatically expected out of future Anglo-
Irish relations? When Collins for instance spoke of the Treaty as being a stepping-stone 
towards ultimate freedom, how much was this a true belief as opposed to justification for 
―selling-short‖ the dream of an Irish Republic? With previous material having tended to 
only examine the men individually, this research differs by looking at all four men and 
seeing how their thoughts and actions combined had a bearing on the course of events.   
 
3) Existing material relating to de Valera and Collins 
 
Of all the individuals concerned, de Valera and Collins have received the most attention, 
with many biographies and other historical works produced in the intervening years. In 
popular culture, Collins has become a rather romantised Irish hero, being one of the most 
high-profile victims of the civil war (killed by an anti-Treaty IRA unit in August 1922), 
and thus unable to reflect in later years upon his intentions and actions in the way 
afforded to de Valera (this is equally true of Brugha and Griffith, both of whom did not 
survive past 1922). Recent works such as the 1996 feature-film Michael Collins, give 
weight to de Valera‘s observation in 1966: ‗It's my considered opinion that in the fullness 
of time, history will record the greatness of Collins and it will be recorded at my 
expense.‘2 Indeed, recent publications such as John Turi‘s England’s Greatest Spy 
(2009), and the 1999 BBC documentary De Valera: Ireland’s Hated Hero, do not portray 
the man in a favourable manner. On the other hand, Diarmaid Ferriter‘s recent 
publication Judging Dev paints a more positive picture, and highlights just what an 
enigma de Valera and his legacy continue to be. Such an issue is not so relevant with 
Collins; rather his enduring legacy has been to go down in history as Ireland‘s lost leader. 
Although his (at times) ruthless nature has not gone undocumented, Collins has become 
                                               
1 Sheila Lawlor, Britain and Ireland 1914-23 (Dublin: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983), p. 99. 
2 Michael Collins, Dir. Neil Jordan. Warner Bros. 1996.  
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rather sentimentalised over the passage of time, as is much the case with many political 
figures who have succumbed at an early age (he was 31 when he was killed). The old 
adage that ―one man‘s terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter‖ is certainly quite apt in 
Collins‘ case. The historian John Regan writes how ‗the attractiveness of Collins‘ story 
and image has generated considerable interest from biographers and film makers as a 
vehicle for ‗explaining‘ the Irish revolution. Conversely, professional historians have 
elected, with a few notable exceptions, not to wrestle with Collins either as a historical or 
mythical figure.‘3 In addition, Collins‘ own publication The Path to Freedom (published 
posthumously in 1922) offers an intriguing insight into his personal thoughts regarding 
Ireland‘s future, although Regan notes ‗they are the utterings of the public Collins and 
Collins was primarily a secretive man‘.4 
 
4) Existing material relating to Griffith and Brugha 
 
Although de Valera‘s and Collins‘ influence upon the Treaty is duly noted by historians, 
it often serves to overshadow the equally critical impact of Griffith and Brugha upon 
events. Such an approach can be partly explained by the less dominant presence of the 
latter two. Although Griffith founded the Sinn Féin movement, it was de Valera who 
placed it on a republican footing and built-up the party into a position whereby it became 
the main outlet through which Irish nationalism was channeled. In the case of Cathal 
Brugha, whereas he held the position of Minister for Defence between 1919 and 1922, it 
was Collins who wielded real influence in the Irish Republican Army (as well as the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in his capacity as president), despite his official role being 
merely that of Director of Intelligence. Even so, this is not to suggest that the efforts of 
Griffith and Brugha should be sidelined in favour of those of de Valera and Collins. 
Griffith would lead the delegation of plenipotentiaries in London and help to oversee the 
Treaty‘s ratification by the Dáil in January 1922, going on to succeed de Valera as 
President of the Irish Republic. Meanwhile, Brugha remained arguably the most fervent 
republican, seemingly unwilling to compromise on the ideals espoused during the Easter 
Rising of April 1916, a sentiment shared by many hard-line republicans. 
                                               
3 John Regan, ‗Michael Collins – The legacy and the Intestacy‘, in Michael Collins and the Making of the 
Irish Free State, eds. by Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (Cork: Mercier Press, 1998), p. 119. 
4 ibid. 
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5) Sources 
 
A variety of material relating to the course of events in Ireland in the period 1916-1922 
(which this paper concentrates on) have been produced, from recent titles such as 
Diarmaid Ferriter‘s Judging Dev (2007), to older works such as Frank Packenham‘s 
Peace by Ordeal (published in 1935 and which is still the definitive work on the finer 
details of the treaty negotiations). In addition, a selection of newspaper articles and 
satirical cartoons are used in this research to see how the Treaty and its terms, along with 
its supporters and opponents, were portrayed in the press. Difficulty arises when looking 
at the four individuals, in that the amount of available sources (both primary and 
secondary) differs for each person. For example, in contrast to Collins and de Valera, 
there is a rather sparse amount of secondary literature relating to the lives of Griffith and 
Brugha, with biographies akin to those of Collins and de Valera not readily available. On 
the other hand, there is plenty of sourceable material relating to Griffith‘s (and to a lesser 
extent Brugha‘s) conduct during the treaty negotiations and debates - this is also true of 
Collins and de Valera. Such material is available via online sources including Documents 
on Irish Foreign Policy (consisting of official correspondence), as well as minutes of 
historical Dáil Debates, which are accessible via the website of the House of the 
Oireachtas (national parliament). For a more in-depth view into what could be termed the 
―unofficial‖ objectives of these political figures, the Bureau of Military History is a 
useful reference point. This collection (which was only made accessible online in January 
2012) consists of approximately two thousand witness statements of individuals who 
were involved in revolutionary activity in the period 1913-1921, and of whom some had 
contact with the politicians dealt with in this research.  
 
6) Method of analysis  
 
The paper is divided into several parts. The first part examines the backgrounds of the 
four individuals; to establish what their activities were during the period from the Easter 
Rising of April 1916 up until the truce of July 1921, when open talks began between 
representatives of Great Britain and Ireland. The second part concentrates on the period 
between the truce and the signing of the Treaty in December 1921, looking at the 
correspondence sent between de Valera and the British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
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George, as well as proceedings during the negotiations in London. The third part of the 
research meanwhile concentrates on how the Treaty was received back in Ireland by 
members of the Dáil, focusing on official minutes from the debates that lasted from 
December 1921 to January 1922. The latter part of the paper examines how the four 
gentlemen and the Treaty were regarded by the Irish public. By using press accounts and 
a selection of satirical cartoons, this part of the paper explores whether the opinions of 
members of the House were in sync with those of their constituents.  
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Part I: De Valera, Collins, Brugha and Griffith in the 
period from April 1916 to July 1921 
 
In order to build-up a better understanding of why the four protagonists took the stances 
they did regarding the Anglo-Irish Treaty, it is necessary to explore their actions and 
mindsets in the period beforehand, in particular events from the Easter Rising of April 
1916 up to the truce of July 1921, a watershed period in Irish history. These five years 
saw the United Kingdom lose her firm grip upon the nation, with violence by the British 
Black and Tans (ex-soldiers brought in to replenish the depleted Royal Irish 
Constabulary) and members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bringing bloodshed to 
the island. The main hostilities of what would become the Irish War of Independence 
began in January 1919 and were only brought to a close by the truce of July 1921. Amidst 
this chaos the island had been partitioned by the British and two new entities formed, 
with the 1920 Government of Ireland Act (which took effect in May 1921) creating a 
Northern and Southern Ireland. This itself ignored the presence of the Irish Republic, a 
self-proclaimed state that had come into existence in January 1919 following Sinn Féin‘s 
win of the majority of Irish seats in the December 1918 UK general election. The newly-
elected members sat in Dublin rather than Westminster, in a new Irish parliament 
christened Dáil Éireann. Attempts by the head of the new (unofficial) republic, Eamon de 
Valera, to gain outside recognition and support (including from the Six Counties of 
Northern Ireland) would ultimately prove futile. Whereas the republic would struggle to 
exert its physical presence, the psychological impact of its existence would have a 
profound effect upon Irish nationalists, including those dealt with here.       
    With the exception of Griffith, the men were all veterans of the Easter Rising, taking 
part in the six days of conflict which raged on the streets of Dublin. De Valera and 
Brugha fought as commanders (with Brugha almost dying from wounds sustained during 
the fighting). Collins meanwhile had helped to defend Dublin‘s General Post Office, from 
where Patrick Pearse (one of the leaders of the Easter Rising) had proclaimed the Irish 
Republic. Griffith on the other hand was a stalwart of Irish politics, differing from the 
other three in that he proposed the establishment of an Anglo-Irish dual-monarchy (akin 
to the Austro-Hungarian model) rather than a republic. Yet despite differing opinions 
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over the future system of government they envisaged, all were committed to the creation 
of a united, self-governing Ireland. Until the truce of 1921, the four had been bound 
together by their shared objective to expel British forces from Ireland – only once peace 
terms were being proposed by Westminster were the personal differences of these men 
made evident. 
 
7) Eamon de Valera 
 
Out of the four men being analysed in this research, de Valera had arguably the greatest 
bearing over events in Ireland in the years after 1916. Having originally received a death 
sentence for his part in the Easter Rising, this sentence was subsequently reprieved 
(possibly helped by his American birth giving him dual citizenship). During the years 
from 1916 to 1921, de Valera was absent from the country for long periods of time 
(either when he was languishing in British jails or touring America between June 1919 
and December 1920 to drum up support for the cause, especially amongst the prevalent 
and influential Irish-American community). Indeed, his trip to the United States may 
have had a slightly detrimental effect. Apart from raising significant funds for the Irish 
cause, de Valera‘s trip failed to secure official American recognition of the Irish 
Republic, with him conceding by May 1921 that ‗except in a crisis in which America's 
own interests are involved and when it might be convenient to hit England through us, is 
there any chance of securing recognition‘.5 More crucially, his eighteen-month absence 
from Ireland during the height of the Irish War of Independence meant that despite being 
kept constantly notified of events, he had no personal experience of the trouble and chaos 
endured by the populace, meaning his opinion would always be slightly warped in 
comparison to those of his colleagues. De Valera‘s most notable achievement during this 
period was to alter the official policy of Ireland‘s foremost nationalist force, Sinn Féin 
(the organisation founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905). In October 1917 Griffith 
(amicably) handed the presidency over to de Valera, whom proceeded to abandon the 
party‘s policy of a dual monarchy in favour of an independent republic. Almost 
simultaneously, de Valera was elected president of the Irish Volunteers (later re-
                                               
5 Eamon de Valera, ―Memorandum to Harry Boland‖, No. 86 NAI DFA ES Box 27 File 158, 30 May 1921, 
Source: Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Volume 1 1919-1922 [online, accessed 22 October 2012].  
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christened the Irish Republican Army), meaning he was in full control of the 
independence movement, which in public he made evident was republican in nature: 
 
The only banner under which our freedom can be won at the present time is the 
Republican banner. It is an Irish Republic that we have a chance of getting 
international recognition...This is not the time for discussion on the best forms of 
government. This is the time to get freedom. Then we can settle by the most 
democratic means what particular form of government we may have.
6
 
 
This address, given at the October 1917 Sinn Féin convention, somewhat belies his inner 
thoughts, which were more flexible as to what options Ireland could take to achieve her 
independence. His public commitment to the republican cause veiled his subtle attempts 
to ―test the water‖ to see if and to what extent fellow republicans would be willing to 
compromise their objectives in the name of achieving independence. A prime example of 
such behaviour is an interview de Valera gave to the Westminster Gazette in February 
1920. In it, he attempted to put pay to the impression many Americans held that Britain 
had a genuine need to retain influence over Ireland in the name of her own national 
security. Such opinion undermined the republic‘s attempts to win round American 
sympathy and so de Valera attempted to counteract this by committing Ireland to a 
permanent neutral status and to draw up an Anglo-Irish settlement similar to the 1901 
Platt Amendment between the United States and Cuba (in which the latter guaranteed that 
her territory would never be used by an outside power). However, the journalist Tim Pat 
Coogan writes that since Americans regarded Cuba‘s position to be that of a ‗political 
slum‘, this analogy was received badly, with John Devoy (a key Irish figure in America) 
attacking de Valera for abandoning the claim for an Irish Republic and ‗falling prey to 
moderation‘.7 De Valera, quickly sensing that his analogy was being received negatively, 
almost immediately sent the following message to the Cabinet back in Dublin: 
 
To ease the minds of everybody I want you to know at all times that I never in 
public or private say or do anything here which is not thoroughly consistent with 
                                               
6 Thomas P. O‘Neill and the Earl of Longford, Eamon de Valera (Dublin: Arrow Books, 1970), p. 68. 
7 Tim Pat Coogan, Michael Collins: The Man Who Made Ireland (New York: Robert Rinehart Publishing, 
2002), p. 190. 
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my attitude at home as you have known it. That will enable you to judge whether 
anything I may by newspapers be reported to have said is true or false. Never forget 
that the Press is an instrument used by the enemy - garbled statements misleading 
headlines etc.
8
 
 
Although this message indicates that he was trying to distance himself from his previous 
comments, it remains ambiguous as to whether de Valera seriously considered such a 
proposal but backed down because fellow republicans disapproved, or whether it was 
merely a flippant consideration that was taken out of context. D.H. Akenson believes the 
interview was significant in that it was made without prior consultation and thus was 
solely his own view.
9
 Certainly, it does illustrate that contrary to his outward committal 
to a republic, beneath this veneer de Valera was considering other options. In a private 
letter to the Director of Publicity in April 1921, he emphasised that the following line be 
put to the press: ‗The Irish people must be recognised as an independent nation with a 
right to determine freely its own government. Interference or dictation from outside must 
be ended. That done England and Ireland might well be the most friendly of 
neighbours.‘10 When one looks at the actual wording de Valera uses (which is always 
significant given his attention to detail), there is no actual mention of a republic. He 
simply talks of an independent nation with the right to self-govern and free from outside 
interference. By expressing himself in this manner, de Valera seemingly did not rule out 
the possibility of Ireland retaining some sort of link with the British Empire – most likely 
dominion status akin to members such as Canada. Evidence does exist that de Valera was 
even considering a compromise before his discussions with David Lloyd George in July 
1921. During an interview given ten years later, the Irish politician James O‘Mara (a 
supporter of the Treaty) claimed that de Valera had been warning against excessive 
public demand for a republic long before his meetings with Lloyd George, purportedly 
telling Harry Boland (a key ally of de Valera): 
 
                                               
8 Eamon de Valera, ―Letter sent to Arthur Griffith‖, No.30 NAI DE 2/245, 17 February 1920, Source: 
Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Volume 1 1919-1922, [online, accessed 23 September 2012]. 
9 D.H Akenson, ‗Was De Valera a Republican?‘, The Review of Politics, 33 (1971), 233-253 (pp. 237-238). 
10 Eamon de Valera, ―Letter sent to the Director of Publicity‖, No. 130 UCDA P150/1602, 24 April 1921, 
Source: Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Volume 1 1919-1922, [online, accessed 29 September 2012]. 
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In public statements, our policy should be not to make it easy for Lloyd George by 
proclaiming that nothing but so and so will satisfy us. Our position should be 
simply that we are insisting on only one right, and that is the right of the people of 
this country to determine for themselves how they should be governed. That sounds 
moderate, but includes everything.
11
 
 
Such statements, notably made in private rather than in public, indicate that de Valera 
was considering other options long before his preliminary discussions with Lloyd George 
confirmed that an Irish Republic independent of the British Empire was not a viable 
option.  
    Although the Treaty would eventually divide the four men, it is important to note the 
respect de Valera commanded amongst his peers. Despite political differences (not as 
evident during these formative years, in which the main preoccupation was fighting the 
war against the British), de Valera held amicable working relations with the other three 
figures. He very much helped to keep the group together; as will be made clear such 
amicable relations were not shared equally between Collins, Griffith and Brugha (the 
latter joking during the Treaty Debates: ‗If Eamon de Valera did not happen to be 
President who would have kept Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins and myself together?‘).12 
As for de Valera himself, his role as a mediator between different factions of Sinn Féin 
not only exposed him to their opposing views but quite possibly also influenced his own 
approach. For example, one senior British official working in Ireland at the time, Mark 
Sturgis, noted that de Valera relied upon the (British born) Irish nationalist Erskine 
Childers (whom Sturgis viewed as a ―fanatical‖ convert) to assist in preparing his 
speeches and letters and that owing to Childers dominance ‗it is difficult to say what are 
de Valera‘s real views and what his attitude would be left to himself‘.13 The position in 
which de Valera found himself during this time (and indeed for the duration of the period 
                                               
11 Eamon de Valera, ―Letter to Harry Boland‖, The O’Mara Papers’, MS 21 (549), 29 March 1931 (quoted 
in correspondence with James O‘Mara), Source: National Library of Ireland [cited in T.R. Dwyer, Michael 
Collins and the Treaty: His Differences with De Valera (Dublin, 1981), p. 30.]. 
12 Cathal Brugha, ―Debate Vol. T No. 16‖, Dáil Éireann, 9 January 1922, Source: Houses of the Oireachtas 
[online, accessed 3 November 2012]. 
13 Mark Sturgis, The Last Days of Dublin Castle: The Mark Sturgis Diaries, ed. by Michael Hopkinson  
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1999), p. 215. 
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covered by this paper) was encapsulated by the famous cartoonist David Low in a piece 
from September 1921:  
 
 
Figure 1: David Low, The Star, 19 September 1921 
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Although a satirical take on the situation (one must also note that it was produced for a 
British rather than Irish audience), Low captures the awkward position in which de 
Valera found himself, having to tentatively restrain the ―whole hog demands‖ of die-hard 
republicans such as Brugha, whilst also avoiding compromising Ireland‘s wish for 
independence.  
 
8) Michael Collins 
 
In the period 1919-1922, Michael Collins would attain a similar level of prestige as that 
enjoyed by de Valera. Not only was he in the eyes of some ―the man who won the war‖, 
it was Collins and not de Valera who had extracted a settlement out of the British. As 
Fintan O‘ Toole of The Irish Times points out, Collins ‗had become the first person in 
Irish history, ever, to be able to come back and say ―We‘ve got a State‖. And I think de 
Valera, in his own mind, had always figured himself out to be that person.‘14 It has often 
been proposed by certain historians that de Valera used Collins for fear that he posed a 
threat to his authority, and to use him as a scapegoat to avoid tarnishing his own political 
clout when the republic was put in doubt. The historian Francis Costello for instance 
suggests that de Valera‘s later siding with Brugha and other hard-line republicans was out 
of a personal motivation to secure his own position and counter against Collins‘ rising 
status.
15
 Although de Valera might have perceived Collins to be a threat, was it truly a 
case of de Valera using Collins? Certainly, the two held differences of opinion; although 
they shared a broadly common goal in securing an independent republic, their thoughts 
on how to achieve this varied. This became evident during the War of Independence, 
when Collins (who despite only officially holding the title of Director of Intelligence of 
the IRA, along with Minister for Finance, actually wielded more influence) dismissed 
tactical suggestions put forward by de Valera. The latter had called for regular and 
sizeable engagements against the British, so as to redress the argument put forth by the 
enemy that the problems in Ireland were merely civil disorder and that the IRA were a 
―murder gang‖. To give weight to Ireland‘s bid for independence, it was important to 
                                               
14 Fintan O‘Toole, ―De Valera: Ireland‘s Hated Hero‖, BBC. 1999. 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ppmznpM_xxw&feature=relmfu> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 
15 Francis Costello, The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916-1923: Years of Revolt (Dublin, 2003),      
p. 232. 
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show the international community (whose support and recognition they were trying to 
obtain) that the IRA was the official army of the Irish Republic, and that this was an 
Anglo-Irish war. Despite this, Collins opposed de Valera‘s suggestion, not out of a sense 
of personal rivalry but because of practicalities. To engage the British using conventional 
military techniques as de Valera was proposing, could decimate the strength of the IRA 
within a short period of time. Given that de Valera was touring America at the height of 
the War of Independence, it is natural that Collins had a more realistic grasp on the 
situation in Ireland. This is suggested in a statement given by Ernie O‘Malley (a 
prominent IRA member who would later become a commander of the anti-Treaty IRA 
during the civil war), who recalls of de Valera during a meeting in January 1921: ‗He had 
lost personal contact during the year and a half he had been away. [...] His questions 
showed that he did not understand the situation in the South. The main strengths of the 
enemy he knew, but things had changed since he had been in Ireland.‘16 Although Collins 
was likely aware that the use of guerrilla warfare would not force the British out of 
Ireland, he was probably conscious that prolonged fighting could bring the British to the 
negotiating table, by which a favourable settlement could then be reached. Despite 
publicly outlining his famed ―stepping stone‖ concept only once an agreement had been 
reached with the British in December 1921, a statement given by Richard Walsh T.D. 
would suggest that this concept had been devised long before the Treaty: 
 
Collins, to my knowledge, at an early stage after his release from Frongoch in 1916, 
talked about the Irish people getting into their hands the powers of partial self 
government and by so doing gaining a tremendous advantage by the exercise of 
such powers for the completing of the struggle for our complete independence.
17
 
 
This statement is very enlightening, for it suggests that Collins‘ stepping stone approach 
to independence was not a spur of the moment defence of his signing of the Treaty, but 
rather a long-held strategy.  
                                               
16 Ernie O‘Malley, On Another Man’s Wound (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1979), p. 293. 
17 Richard Walsh T.D., ―Document W.S. 400‖, 28 June 1950, pp. 152-153, Source: Bureau of Military 
History [online, accessed 19 October 2012]. 
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    As with the other figures under analysis, one has to pay close attention to what Collins 
said in public compared to what his private thoughts were. In public he frequently 
portrayed himself as an ardent republican, such as in a 1920 interview with the American 
Evening Public Ledger newspaper. When asked whether he would accept dominion home 
rule, Collins replied ‗the same effort that would get us dominion home rule will get us a 
republic‘.18 However, the historian Peter Hart notes that off record, he was said to be 
much more accommodating.
19
 This is significant, not only because it illustrates that 
Collins‘ approach to independence was flexible, but also because the journalist who 
conducted the interview, an American named Carl W. Ackerman, also happened to be a 
British spy.
20
 In addition timing is important; by August 1920 Ireland had been engaged 
in hostilities for over a year and a half, and yet the situation remained unchanged. 
Meanwhile, attempts to gain international recognition had failed; despite the Allies‘ 
professing the right of small nations to self-determination, Ireland‘s cause was not being 
heard. There is evidence of Collins making contact with the British before the truce of 
July 1921, in an attempt to break the stalemate (for instance with the British Assistant 
Under-Secretary in Ireland Andy Cope). Mark Sturgis makes mention in his diary entry 
for April 1921 of a discussion he had with James MacMahon (Under Secretary for 
Ireland) regarding Collins‘ aforementioned interview: ‗I asked what about the Ackerman 
story and MacMahon said it was exactly what Michael Collins would say to any 
newspaper man‘, implying that his public utterances were at odds with his personal 
opinions.
21
 Indeed, in January 1921 he had gone so far as to privately endorse the 
development of the idea of dominion Status for Ireland, admitting in a letter to Griffith 
that such a scheme ‗would be of advantage to us‘.22 In his 1922 publication The Path to 
Freedom, Collins would state that ‗the Irish struggle has always been for freedom – 
freedom from English occupation, from English interference, from English domination – 
not from freedom with any particular label attached to it‘.23 Although this could be 
                                               
18 Carl W. Ackerman, ―Sinn Fein Leader Uncompromising‖, Evening Public Ledger, 26 August 1920, p. 4, 
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construed as an attempt to defend what some deemed to be his ―betrayal‖ of the republic, 
this non-explicit commitment to a republic was concurrent with one of his election 
campaign addresses given in November 1918: ‗You are required by your votes to assert 
before the nations of the world that Ireland‘s claim is to the status of an independent 
nation, and that we shall be satisfied with nothing less than our full claim.‘24 The term 
―independent nation‖ rather than ―independent republic‖ is noteworthy, although it must 
be highlighted that as a Sinn Féin candidate it would have been self-evident to the 
electorate that Collins was seeking votes on the mandate of creating an Irish Republic (as 
proclaimed in 1916) and withdrawing Irish representation from the British parliament.
25
 
As will be discussed in further detail, the omission of the term ―republic‖ from official 
documents and public comments would become a critical issue for Collins and the other 
figures. 
 
9) Cathal Brugha 
 
Out of all four figures, Cathal Brugha was the most hard-line republican, dedicating his 
life to the founding of a united Ireland completely severed of all British ties. Appointed 
the first president of Dáil Eireann in January 1919, from April 1919 to January 1922 he 
then held the position of Minister for Defence, a role which would bring him in close 
contact with the IRA‘s Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins, against whom he would 
foster a deep loathing and of which Coogan argues ‗was to be a casual factor in creating 
civil war‘.26 There are several theories as to why this personal animosity towards one 
another developed. One suggestion is that the feud was due to the different positions the 
men held. One former IRB (Irish Republican Brotherhood) member, Dan MacCarthy, put 
the feeling of bitterness down to popularity: ‗I believe it all developed as a result of 
prominent I.R.A. Officers coming up from the country looking for Collins rather than 
Cathal Brugha who was Minister for Defence. Collins was always more popular with all 
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these Officers. This was resented very much by Brugha.‘27 Whether jealousy truly played 
a factor in Brugha‘s distaste towards Collins is unclear; what is evident is that Brugha 
distrusted Collins. According to Richard Walsh, the supposed ‗German Plot‘ of May 
1918 (in which the British claimed the Germans were planning to help support another 
Irish uprising, a claim Collins denied) exposed this distrust: ‗His whole attitude towards 
Collins's […] denials was skeptical, and his general attitude towards Collins after this 
was one of suspicion. This incident at the testing of the Executive was, in my opinion, the 
real start of the feud.‘28 Ernest Blythe (a supporter of the Treaty), who was a regular 
attendant of the weekly Cabinet meetings, spoke of frequent friction between the two ‗in 
connection with all sorts of matters‘, with Brugha purportedly always being very 
sarcastic with Collins when they disagreed, and Collins distinctly rough in talking to 
Brugha.
29
 On the other hand, it would be ill-founded to suggest that the rift between 
Collins and Brugha was solely attributed to their characters – there were serious 
differences of opinion in the tactics that should be used against the British. Tim Pat 
Coogan argues that Brugha was a ‗static warfare‘ man: ‗It‘s doubtful if he ever seriously 
believed they could win the war. For him, carrying on the fight was the important 
thing‘.30 Herein lay a key difference between the men; whereas Collins was patriotic 
albeit pragmatic, Brugha believed in the necessity of personal sacrifice if it safeguarded 
the republic. Coogan‘s assessment though that Brugha was a proponent of static warfare 
is slightly misleading, for the Minister for Defence did in fact propose taking the war to 
the British mainland. General Seán MacEoin reflects upon a meeting he had with Brugha 
in March 1921, in which the minister outlined arguably his most daring scheme:  
 
To save Ireland, you have got to wipe out the guilty ones who sent the Black and 
Tans here. We have got to wipe out every member of the British Cabinet. I brought 
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you here today to order you to lead to London, and in London, a party that will do 
it. To each one of you will be named the Member of the Cabinet he is to execute.
31
 
 
MacEoin added that when he re-laid the plan to Collins, the latter exclaimed: ‗You are 
mad! Do you think that England has only the makings of one Cabinet?‘32 Brugha‘s other 
plans included machine-gunning members in the House of Commons, as well as  
members of the public in British cinemas, along with acts of arson and sabotage (the 
latter being carried out to a limited extent). Even when the British were willing to enter 
into a truce, Brugha displayed a reluctance to cease hostilities, Blythe recalling him 
saying in one meeting ‗that the country had been brought up to a high pitch of resolution 
and that if the fighting were stopped it might not be easy to get things going again‘.33  
    People who knew and worked with Brugha spoke of a man dedicated to the cause but 
difficult to work alongside, with Walsh describing him as having ‗a great sense of justice 
and fair play‘ but also being extremely stubborn.34 Although there was a degree of 
respect for the minister because of his heroism in 1916, there was also contempt for the 
naiveté of his views.
35
 Such character traits brought him into conflict with many of his 
peers, the animosity towards Collins serving as a prime example. Arthur Griffith was 
another senior Irish politician with whom Brugha shared fraught relations, with de Valera 
noting on one occasion how it had been his special role ‗to mediate the vast fundamental 
differences between the ideals of men like Cathal Brugha and Arthur Griffith‘.36 J.J. 
O‘Kelly (an opponent of the Treaty and, according to Ernest Blythe, Brugha‘s only real 
―yes-man‖ within the Cabinet) claimed how one issue of contention was over what 
direction Sinn Féin should take:
 37
 
 
The main feature of the meetings was the difference in outlook between Cathal 
Brugha and Griffith, Cathal maintaining that the policy of Sinn Fein should be of a 
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fully military character, and Griffith having a different view. Cathal had his way 
and it was he that outlined the main resolution for the policy and constitution of the 
organization.
38
 
 
A deep ideological divide between the two is also testified by Robert Brennan (one-time 
Irish Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs), who commented: 
 
In the days succeeding the Rising and before the historic Ard Pheis of 1917, they 
came near the breaking point several times. Griffith was striving very hard to keep 
Sinn Fein to its original purpose and policy […] Brugha willing to adopt the name 
Sinn Fein – which had been forced by press and public on to Volunteers - would 
have nothing to do with the Constitution of 1782 and scorned passive resistance.
39
 
 
Meanwhile the historian Padraic Colum wrote that during this period, Brugha had 
complete contempt for Griffith‘s ―moderation‖: ‗When Griffith disagreed with Brugha on 
any point, the reply in so many words was, ―I didn‘t expect you to agree. We know where 
you stand. You would be more at home in a constitutional movement. We are fighters, 
and you have no standing among us.‖‘40 It should be clarified that despite the wide 
schism between their ideological beliefs, Brugha and Griffith still shared a mutual respect 
for one another. Brennan said that in spite of rarely ever agreeing on anything, Griffith 
was genuinely fond of Brugha, that he had ‗always a warm corner in his heart for Brugha 
and more than once I heard him defend him in his absence, paying tribute to his single-
mindedness and whole-hearted sincerity‘.41 In comparison, Blythe testifies that in the 
period up until the truce, Brugha ‗had at this time great respect for Griffith's political 
judgment, and very frequently deferred to him in a marked way on matters of general a 
policy‘.42 
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10)  Arthur Griffith 
 
Arthur Griffith began his career as a journalist, and by the turn of the twentieth century 
was producing political publications such as the United Irishman, which were read by 
men including Collins.
43
 His biggest contribution to Irish politics was his founding of 
Sinn Féin in 1905, which would become the key nationalist movement after the Easter 
Rising (although the British authorities would wrongly attribute responsibility for the 
rising to the organisation). In comparison to the other three gentlemen, Griffith was more 
reserved in his approach to securing Irish independence. Rather than achieving this goal 
through an act of revolution such as attempted in 1916, Griffith sought to undermine the 
British through a policy of passive resistance – namely persuading Irish MPs to abstain 
from Westminster. Such a scheme was inspired by the Hungarian nationalist movement, 
which in the 1860s had succeeded in getting the restoration of the Hungarian parliament 
via active agitation at home and refusal to send representatives to the Imperial parliament 
in Vienna.
44
 This is not to say that Griffith was a pacifist per se, but rather that he 
regarded the use of violence to be generally counterproductive (no doubt in part shaped 
by his time spent in South Africa during the late 1890s amongst the Boers, witnessing 
first-hand their struggle to cut themselves loose from the Empire). Instead, he held faith 
in a political approach to resolving Anglo-Irish differences, with his 1904 publication The 
Resurrection of Hungary advocating the creation of an Anglo-Irish dual monarchy akin to 
that of Austro-Hungary. This approach is however slightly contradicted by a statement 
given by Robert Brennan (who sided with the anti-Treaty faction), who recounts a 
disagreement Griffith had whilst incarcerated in Gloucester jail in 1919: 
 
‗We need not‘, said A.G. [Arthur Griffith], ‗care what the English called the 
country if we were satisfied we had got what we wanted.‘ Tom Hunter, who was no 
diplomat, said bluntly: ‗What about your King, Lords and Commons, A.G.?‘ 
‗That's right,‘ said Pierce McCann, ‗you were always in favour of the restoration of 
the dual monarchy.‘ [...] A.G. turned on Pierce, ‗When did I say that?‘ he asked, 
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and there was thunder in the air. ‗Why, you've always said it.‘ said Pierce, ‗in every 
issue of Sinn Fein and Nationality and in ‗The Resurrection of Hungary‘.‘ […] 
[A.G.] ‗I never said anything of that kind. What I said was that the Irish people 
should refuse to treat with England till she had conformed to the Act in which the 
English Government renounced their claim to legislate for Ireland and declared 
inalienable the right of the King, Lord and Commons of Ireland so to legislate.‘ 
‗Ain't that the same thing?‘ asked Pierce, innocently. ‗It's nothing of the kind. 
When you say you refuse to treat with England until they restore a certain kind of 
regime, it does not mean that that regime is your final aim.‘ ‗So under your plan we 
could go on to a republic?‘ ‗Under my plan, as you call it, your hands would not be 
tied. You could go on to anything the Irish people wanted.‘45 
 
Griffith‘s comments in the latter part of this encounter (one has to keep in mind that 
Brennan was relaying this conversation purely from memory) bear much similarity to 
Collins‘ later stepping stone analogy. Indeed, the Irish Independent newspaper records 
Griffith spoke words to that effect at a lecture in Belfast in November 1917, saying that 
for his part, if Sinn Féin ‗got a stepping stone to separation he would have no hesitation 
in taking it‘.46 This was a rather pragmatic approach; Britain would never grant Ireland 
total freedom for fear that it would undermine the Empire by encouraging independence 
movements in regions such as India. Ultimately, Griffith‘s faith in a dual-monarchy 
system acceptable to all would not be realised, with Unionists and republicans both 
disinterested and dismissive of the proposal.
47
 
 
11)  Observations 
 
During the period 1916-1921, all four men were united under the banner of Irish 
nationalism; with efforts concentrated on expelling British forces out of Ireland, their 
political differences were put to one side. As the War of Independence dragged on this 
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began to change, with tensions becoming more visible, as Robert Barton recalled after his 
release from prison in June 1921:  
 
I found there was internal dissension which had not existed when I was arrested. 
[…] Previously we had been a very happy family. Then I returned, I found personal 
animosity between members of the Cabinet; this very much disturbed me. […] 
Ministers were not co-operating in the way they had before.
48
 
 
Although all four men were members of Sinn Féin, there were no other circumstances 
dictating that they ought to share a strong alliance. They had only become au fait with 
one another after the Easter Rising, and had had relatively little personal contact with one 
another, on account of their time spent incarcerated or abroad (such as de Valera‘s 
eighteen month absence in America).
49
 In reality, the only common concern of all four 
men was to expel the British from Ireland. The real issue of contention was how to do 
this. Griffith sought the political route, bound by the realisation that the British would not 
agree to totally relinquish Ireland. De Valera also preferred the political approach, trying 
in vain to secure official recognition of the Irish Republic from the United States, and 
trying to take advantage of the Allies‘ claim to the rights of small nations to self-
determination. With the birth of new small nations in Eastern Europe and the recent 
Russian revolution(s), such faith was not as short-sighted as may seem in hindsight.  
Indeed, as Frank Pakenham (de Valera‘s official biographer) observed, ‗in an age of self-
determination it was rather curious that Ireland should face the dilemma of either a war of 
extermination from a neighbouring Empire of friendly congenial citizens, or disestablish 
her declared Republic and risk the possibility of civil war‘.50 
    Collins and Brugha on the other hand were military men, although again their tactics 
differed. The former used guerilla warfare to eventually bring the British to the 
negotiating table; the latter believed in a terror campaign on the British mainland. In the 
disorder of war, and with the men often separated from one another, although there were 
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signs of disagreement over Ireland‘s future, these would only really manifest themselves 
once hostilities had ceased and they were re-assembled in Dublin. Despite these 
differences, their alliance during this period was instrumental in preserving a unified 
Nationalist front in Ireland against Britain, as Robert Brennan alluded to: 
 
It is true that without him [Collins] Sinn Fein could not have achieved the success it 
did in the time it did, but this is not less true of Eamon de Valera or Arthur Griffith. 
For instance, Collins could never have brought about the unity of the Republicans 
in 1917, or that of all classes in the nation in 1918, as de Valera did; nor could he 
have voiced the nation‘s will so brilliantly and so persuasively as did Arthur 
Griffith.
51
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Part II: The Treaty Negotiations in London 
 
As discussed, prior to the truce of July 1921 it was already evident that de Valera, 
Collins, Griffith and Brugha were divided in terms of their approach to how Ireland 
should gain independence and what political model the country should adopt. In spite of 
their differences of opinion, they still managed to work alongside one another in a 
combined effort to combat the British. Only once open Anglo-Irish talks began did these 
opposing views start to create serious tensions within Sinn Féin. This part of the paper 
deals with the period from July 1921 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in London 
on 6 December 1921, looking at how miscommunication, coupled with the men‘s 
political differences, allowed a Treaty to be signed that would break their alliance 
irrevocably.   
 
12) De Valera in the period July – October 1921 
 
Dialogue between Eamon de Valera and the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, 
began on 14 July 1921, with the two politicians meeting in London for a series of one-to-
one meetings.  The following week Lloyd George sent de Valera the first set of British 
proposals for a settlement, in essence a limited form of dominion status. This would 
apply to the whole of Ireland, but would also still allow for ‗full recognition of the 
existing powers and privileges of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, which cannot be 
abrogated except by their own consent‘.52 This opening offer by the British was rejected 
unanimously by the Dáil, de Valera clarifying why this was so in a letter dated 30 
August:
53
  
 
They were not an invitation to Ireland to enter into 'a free and willing' partnership 
with the free nations of the British Commonwealth. They were an invitation to 
Ireland to enter in a guise, and under conditions which determine a status definitely 
inferior to that of these free States. Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand 
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are all guaranteed against the domination of the major State, not only by the 
acknowledged constitutional rights which give them equality of status with Great 
Britain and absolute freedom from the control of the British Parliament and 
Government, but by the thousands of miles that separate them from Great Britain. 
Ireland would have the guarantees neither of distance nor of right.
54
 
 
Although these terms were rejected by the Dáil, as has been previously mentioned, prior 
to the truce de Valera had implied (albeit through slightly veiled comments) that he 
would consider the option of dominion status. He had even reputedly remarked to Jan 
Smuts (the former Boer independence leader now a prominent South African and British 
Commonwealth statesman) on one occasion that ‗if the status of Dominion rule is 
offered, I will use all our machinery to get the people to accept it‘.55 In addition, during a 
speech given on 17 August 1921, de Valera alluded that for the sake of Irish unity he 
‗would be willing to suggest to the Irish people to give up a good deal in order to have an 
Ireland that could look to the future without anticipating distracting internal problems‘.56 
Despite being a slightly ambiguous statement (a reoccurring trait of the man), one can 
surmise that in order to eliminate such ‗distracting internal problems‘, namely those 
connected with the six northern counties, de Valera would consider re-evaluating Irish 
demands for a republic so as to conform to Unionist and British needs, the most likely 
outcome of which would be dominion status. Just before making the statement, the 
newly-anointed President of the Irish Republic had said to the Dáil that he and other 
members of the Cabinet were not ‗Republican doctrinaires‘, as well as inferring that 
when given the choice, the electorate had voiced their desire for ‗Irish freedom and Irish 
independence‘ rather than strictly a republican form of government.57 Such observations 
were indicative of his own personal desire to extract himself from ―the strait-jacket of a 
Republic‖, but also serve to highlight what an enigmatic figure de Valera was. As 
exemplified in the Westminster Gazette interview, he had a tendency to say one thing and 
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then disassociate himself from his previous comments if they were judged negatively. 
This tendency was evident during his correspondence with Lloyd George in September 
1921, asserting in one letter ‗our nation has formally declared its independence and 
recognises itself as a sovereign State‘58, only to follow this up a week later (when the 
Prime Minister threatened to break off talks) by clarifying ‗we would have thought it as 
unreasonable to expect you, as a preliminary, to recognise the Irish Republic formally, or 
informally‘.59 One could argue that such (contradictory) behaviour is a trait of politics; in 
the case of Eamon de Valera he seemingly veered between being pragmatic and 
staunchly idealistic, with the historian Diarmaid Ferriter commenting how ‗his critics 
quite legitimately pointed to the inconsistency of his position; having prepared for 
compromise with Lloyd George ―he had then rushed back to the rock of 
republicanism‖.‘60 
    One of the enduring questions surrounding the Anglo-Irish negotiations is why de 
Valera chose not to attend, with instead a team of plenipotentiaries sent, including 
Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith. Debate has arisen over whether de Valera shirked 
his responsibilities in not attending, or whether his absence was part of a ploy to extract 
maximum concessions from the British. Certainly, given his experience, stature, and the 
fact that members of his own party wanted him to attend, it was puzzling why he 
remained absent.
61
 In an address to the Dáil on 23 August 1921 de Valera stated: 
   
The one chief reason I had in going myself to these preliminary negotiations I saw 
it gave me a definite opportunity to bring Ireland's case before the world. I can stay 
at home where I will be more valuable and it will be quite evident to the public the 
reason I do not want to be one of them is that the duties at home require my 
attention.
62
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In 1963, de Valera clarified what such duties back home comprised of: 
 
Whilst the negotiations were in progress it was imperative that the British should 
realise that they had to face here a determined people, ready to accept a renewal of 
the war rather than give way on the essentials. For this reason, my presence at home 
was desirable so that I might play my part in keeping public opinion firm and in 
doing everything possible to have the Army well organised and strong. Besides, I 
apprehended that rumours of ―surrender‖ were sure to be rife the moment it was 
reported that a settlement was in sight. It was important that I should be at hand to 
deal with any public uneasiness to which these might give rise.
63
 
 
The timing of this latter statement is interesting, for in 1963 he was speaking as President 
of the Republic of Ireland (which came into existence in 1949), reflecting upon a time 
when he was the President of the Irish Republic (in existence, albeit non-officially, from 
1919 to 1922). The stance de Valera wanted to publicly exhibit was that he needed to 
remain at home to act as a figurehead with whom the Irish people could rally. A more 
subtle reason, as given to the Dáil on 14 September 1921, was that as head of state he felt 
it was not his position to participate directly in the negotiations: 
 
He really believed it was vital at this stage that the symbol of the Republic should 
be kept untouched and that it should not be compromised in any sense by any 
arrangements which it might be necessary for our plenipotentiaries to make. […] It 
was not a shirking of duty, but he realised the position and how necessary it was to 
keep the Head of the State and the symbol untouched and that was why he asked to 
be left out.
64
 
 
Indeed, for himself to enter into negotiations as president of a self-proclaimed republic 
that people had sacrificed their lives for, only to come back with a settlement that 
effectively disestablished that republic, would be political suicide. Critics of de Valera 
have used the aforementioned factors to suggest that the president neglected his position; 
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that he used men such as Collins and Griffith to ―do the dirty work‖. One such critic, the 
journalist and historical writer Tim Pat Coogan, argues for instance that de Valera acted 
as he did out of narrow self-interest and that ‗after four meetings alone with the British 
Prime Minster he, more than any man alive, knew what Lloyd George was putting on the 
table – it did not, could not and would not contain a republic‘.65 On the other hand, such 
lines of thought ignore the logic behind de Valera‘s decision to remain in Ireland. As the 
historian T. Dwyer explains, de Valera opined that if Lloyd George tried the strong-arm 
tactics he had used in July, the delegation could always use the necessity of consulting 
him as an excuse to prevent it being rushed into any hasty decisions.
66
 Once again, de 
Valera would be acting as a mediator. 
    From the start of the truce de Valera appeared to distance himself from an unswerving 
committal to the establishment of a republic. Just prior to his accepting of his presidential 
role, he stated to the Dáil:  
 
I cannot accept office except on the understanding that no road is barred, that we 
shall be free to consider every method. […] I want you to understand I have not in 
my mind made up as to anything. I have kept my mind in a fluid state as long as I 
am in a responsible position to the country and it is only on that basis that I can 
accept office.
67
 
 
De Valera appointed the plenipotentiaries on 14 September 1921, consisting of George 
Gavan Duffy, Éamonn Duggan, Robert Barton, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith 
(chairman of the delegation). They were to be granted full powers ‗because if they go 
over they needed to have the moral feeling of support of the position to do the best they 
could for Ireland‘.68 This was slightly contradicted however by de Valera‘s personal 
stipulation that before making any decisions, the plenipotentiaries would send the details 
back to Dublin to await approval.
69
 Thus the plenipotentiaries‘ powers were notably 
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curtailed by de Valera‘s contradictory and rather ambiguous note, with Coogan adding 
that ‗nowhere was there written down a clear, rounded statement of what the delegation 
was actually supposed to work towards and settle for‘.70 What reasoning lay behind de 
Valera‘s choice of plenipotentiaries? Sheila Lawlor proposes that after his meetings and 
correspondence with Lloyd George, the president possibly became convinced that the 
constitutional limits of a settlement were already fixed and that even if he were willing to 
accept such a position, he could not hope to bring the extremists, or the ideologues, or the 
IRA men with him. ‗For that, Collins would be necessary; and Collins would drive the 
hardest bargain with Lloyd George. Griffith would go as a man of experience, as a 
popular name, as the father of Sinn Féin.‘71 In the case of Griffith, although he was now 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was still a puzzling choice to appoint him as chairman, 
given that he had openly been a dual-monarchist (a fact well-known to the British), thus 
weakening whatever slim chance there was of achieving anything close to British 
recognition of an Irish republic.
72
 Robert Barton implied that such a decision might have 
been swayed by the fact that de Valera had more confidence in Griffith‘s judgement as a 
negotiator than Collins, influenced in part by the fact that Brugha distrusted Collins and 
that he and de Valera were very close.
73
 In the case of Collins, as with Lawlor, the 
academic Jason Knirck also surmises that Collins was picked for the delegation as he 
would be the one who could extract the most from the British: ‗According to de Valera, 
the British considered Collins a hard-liner, and his presence in London would thereby 
induce the British to make concessions, knowing that Collins would have to be satisfied 
if any settlement was to be accepted by other die-hard republicans.‘74 Such die-hard 
republicans included Harry Boland (a close friend of de Valera and Collins), whom at a 
meeting of the IRA Executive early in 1921 argued that Collins should be included in any 
forthcoming peace talks, ‗since ‗a ―gunman‖ will screw better terms out of them than an 
ordinary politician‘.75 On the other hand though, writing to Joe McGarrity (a leading Irish 
republican in the United States) in December 1921 de Valera made the following claim: 
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‗That Griffith would accept the Crown under pressure I had no doubt [...] from the 
preliminary work which M.C. [Collins] was doing with the IRB, of which I had heard 
something, and from my own weighing up of him I felt certain that he too was 
contemplating accepting the Crown.‘76 This personal thought of de Valera is slightly 
curious in that he admits that Griffith‘s and Collins‘ acceptance of the Crown was not a 
complete shock, even though in public he seemed in disbelief when he first held of the 
terms the two had conceded. This example of de Valera‘s inner thoughts helps to support 
those critics of his whom believe his decision to send Collins in particular was more 
personally motivated, Coogan for example arguing it was ‗in order to further his secret 
campaign to gain supremacy over Collins‘.77 Certainly, it was quite a turnaround for the 
president now to send Collins to London, despite the latter‘s protest (coupled with the 
fact his request to attend the July talks had been declined). Rather though than some 
personal scheme regarding a possible power-struggle, one has to remain conscious of the 
president‘s overriding concern with keeping the different factions within Sinn Féin 
unified. Collins commanded large influence, especially amongst the IRA and the IRB; 
Griffith meanwhile was representative of a sizable number of moderates within the Sinn 
Féin movement who favoured diplomacy rather than violence to achieve independence. 
The historian Michael Hopkinson uses a similar line of argument, believing that the 
appointment of the delegation was done in order to appease the various elements within 
the Sinn Féin coalition: ‗Griffith was chosen to represent the Sinn Féin constitutional 
approach, Collins the army and IRB, while Robert Barton and George Gavan Duffy, 
together with Erskine Childers as secretary, were meant to represent de Valera‘s interests 
and to act as a check on Griffith and Collins.‘78  
 
13) Events during the negotiations 
 
Discussions between the Irish plenipotentiaries and members of the British Cabinet were 
held in Downing Street over a two month period from 11 October to 6 December 1921. 
Despite repeated pleas for de Valera to join the discussions, he along with Cathal Brugha 
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remained in Dublin, kept informed by daily dispatches from the delegates, a somewhat 
cumbersome arrangement which proved detrimental to their effectiveness. In the Treaty 
Debates de Valera would criticise the plenipotentiaries for reneging on his instruction to 
refer any settlement back to Dublin for approval. However during the negotiations 
themselves he ignored warnings that this safeguard might not be working. For instance at 
the beginning of November Seán T. O'Kelly (second President of Ireland) suggested that 
through the ―domination‖ of Griffith and Collins, the delegates were surrendering on 
many points, including the status of sovereignty, but de Valera assured himself that 
everything was safe inasmuch as the delegates could not sign anything without first 
submitting it for the Cabinet‘s approval.79 The key question is what exactly were the 
plenipotentiaries expected to gain for Ireland? This would become a major source of 
contention during the Treaty Debates, for when the Irish delegation departed for London 
they were given no set list of demands to be put forth to the British; even on major issues 
such as Ulster a firm line had not been achieved until after the negotiations had begun. 
Broadly speaking, it was understood by the plenipotentiaries to try and bring back a 
united Ireland with as little political affiliation with the British Empire as was possible, 
what Padraic Colum described as an ―Atlantic Switzerland‖.80 There were naturally going 
to be issues of difference between the Irish and British delegates, defence being one such 
issue (for it had a bearing on the true sovereignty of any future Irish state, especially in 
terms of neutrality). The British wanted to retain control of four Irish ports (which they 
ultimately did), but Griffith argued against this, questioning what country at war with 
England would count as neutral an Ireland that rendered such vital assistance to her 
enemy.
81
  
    Another more contentious issue was that relating to the status of Ulster. In May 1921 
the Government of Ireland Act came into effect, which partitioned Ulster (referring to the 
six counties of Northern Ireland) from the twenty-six southern counties. It was agreed 
that if a breakdown in talks were to occur, the Irish would be in a stronger position (in the 
eyes and sympathies of international observers) if the break were to occur over Ulster and 
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desires for national unity, rather than over the ambiguities of allegiance to the British 
Crown. The issue was always going to be of difficulty for the Irish; by the time of the 
truce the British had created a new Northern Parliament, thus meaning that whatever the 
outcome of the talks, there was never any possibility of the status of this new government 
being compromised. In spite of the importance of the issue of Ulster to the Irish 
negotiation strategy, indecision meant that by the third day of talks in London, a clear list 
of proposals regarding the North still had not reached the plenipotentiaries, who were 
forced to simply try and put off such discussions until instructions were sent from 
Dublin.
82
 Whereas the academic Michael Laffan suggests it might have been indicative of 
how little the North mattered to the Dáil Cabinet, it is perhaps more indicative of the 
inexperience of the Irish delegation when it came to serious political negotiations.
83
 The 
aforementioned example of Ulster and the plenipotentiaries‘ failure to explicitly demand 
a united Ireland at the beginning of the talks showed, according to John McColgan, ‗an 
unfortunate lack of tactical sense‘.84 The team of plenipotentiaries, comprised of 
individuals such as Collins (who did not even wish to be part of the team), were 
attempting to negotiate with British delegates who were well versed in international 
diplomacy, and who had the added (psychological) benefit of negotiating within their 
own surroundings. Robert Barton epitomised this in a later interview: ‗We Irishmen were 
nervous and ill at ease, it was our first introduction to diplomacy. The English were at 
home and confident in surroundings where they had met and out-manoeuvred or 
intimidated their opponents in a hundred similar struggles.‘85 Griffith and Collins were 
further hindered by the need to constantly refer (and sometimes travel) back to Dublin. 
    The other issue of contention (which seems to have been of more concern) was 
Ireland‘s future relationship with the British Empire. Collins and Griffith would have 
been conscious of the fact that to hardliners such as Brugha, to accept any terms whereby 
the British Monarch still remained as a figurehead in Ireland, no matter how vague, 
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would be unacceptable. The issue was discussed in detail during a Cabinet meeting in 
Dublin on 3 December 1921: 
 
At the meeting Cathal Brugha objected to any form of oath. Of course, he said, if 
the British wanted an oath from us to respect whatever ―Treaty‖ was made, we 
might give it, provided they swore to us in return. The President also wanted to 
know where lay the need for an oath of any kind. Mr. Collins said it was to be 
sugar-coating to enable the English people to swallow the pill. ―Well‖, said the 
President, ―if it be really necessary and that we get all else we want, what harm 
would it be if we had an oath like this‖; and he spoke words paraphrasing the form 
in the draft ―Treaty‖. Cathal still persisted in refusing to consider any form of oath 
whatever, and there the matter ended.
86
 
 
At this stage the British proposal was an oath recognising the King as the head of state 
and of the Empire.
87
 This explains Brugha‘s refusal to accept such terms; although the 
allegiance of Irishmen would be sworn firstly to their own constitution, some semblance 
of allegiance would still be owed to the British Crown and thus this did not constitute full 
independence. Crucially at this meeting however, Colm Ó Murchadha (a Cabinet 
secretary) testified that neither Brugha nor indeed de Valera actually proposed that the 
British terms be rejected, but that they should be improved upon.
88
 De Valera sought to 
re-word the document so that the British monarch would be the recognised head of a 
future association rather than of the Irish state. However in a private letter sent to Harry 
Boland four days previously, he wrote: 
 
The British ultimatum is allegiance to their King. We will never recommend that 
such allegiance be rendered. You know how fully I appreciate all that WAR means 
to our people, and what my misgivings are as to the outcome of war. Without 
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explanation you will understand then that if I appear with those who choose war, it 
is only because the alternative is impossible without dishonour.
89
 
 
Aside from seeming to have already resigned himself to the inevitability of a breakdown 
in talks, de Valera inferred that if forced to choose, he would stand by rather than 
compromise the republic. It reiterated what he had disclosed to Griffith in a memorandum 
in October 1921, namely that an allegiance to the King was unacceptable, even if this 
meant war.
90
 This contrast of private and public thoughts does allow us to identify how 
far de Valera was willing to compromise. For the unity of Ireland, he was willing to 
acknowledge the British Crown, but only as the head of any future association with the 
Empire, not as head of the Irish state itself. This subtle but highly significant difference, 
which Griffith (and to a lesser extent Collins) apparently did not appreciate, was part of 
de Valera‘s innovative ―External Association‖ concept, which would in time grow to be 
accepted by more hard-line men such as Brugha. On the other hand, with negotiations 
still ongoing, de Valera was continuing to press the plenipotentiaries to gain more from 
the British. Immediately after the Treaty‘s signing, the president said of the situation: ‗A 
win meant triumph, definite and final. If we lost, the loss would not be as big as it 
seemed, for we would be no worse than we had been six months ago.‘91 In essence, de 
Valera had wanted the delegates (possibly with Collins ―the gunman‖ specifically in 
mind) to risk the renewal of war in order to gain maximum concessions (most plausibly 
external association) but this was one risk Collins was unwilling to take, having 
purportedly said to Griffith at one point ‗I will not agree to anything which threatens to 
plunge the people of Ireland into a war – not without their authority‘.92 Although he 
would claim afterwards that he regarded the British threat of renewed war to be a bluff, 
during the final stages of negotiations he was under the impression that the strength of the 
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IRA had been diminished to such an extent (Hopkinson quotes one figure of just three 
thousand active members) that a protracted campaign against the British was untenable.
93
 
 
14) Collins’ and Griffith’s role in the negotiations 
 
When Michael Collins put his signature to a treaty partitioning Ireland, falling short of a 
republic, many were surprised and dismayed that he had committed such an act, branding 
him a traitor. As already mentioned, those who knew Collins believed he would be an 
asset to the republican cause, since he maintained the figure of a hard-liner. Richard 
Walsh however gives an enlightening view into possibly the real thoughts of Collins:  
 
He seemed to my mind at times to be obstinately determined to preserve what we 
claimed as our national rights - sovereign independence for all parts of the national 
territory and at other times he, during his thinking aloud periods, seemed prepared 
to compromise on what we held to be the first principles of nationalism. In my 
opinion […] Collins was trying to find out, as far as he could, how the country was 
thinking and what way opinions were drifting from time to time.
94
 
 
This description implies that Collins was very similar to de Valera, in that despite having 
the outward appearance of a hard-line republican, in private he was more flexible as 
regards to Ireland‘s political future. Walsh also adds that in private (but never at meetings 
or public gatherings) Collins made the remark that had past attempts to introduce Home 
Rule for Ireland been successful, ‗it would have been a great asset to us, as we would 
undoubtedly have got control of such bodies and services in the government of the 
country which could be used effectively as a lever to extract further measures of 
freedom‘.95 Such utterances are concurrent with the pragmatic nature of Collins; in the 
War of Independence he had discounted conventional warfare in favour of a guerrilla 
campaign to play to Irish strengths. Now Collins was using a similar approach for 
diplomacy (an area in which he had little experience) - use the British offer as the first 
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stage in a longer-term process towards reunification and full independence for Ireland. As 
he wrote in private:  ‗It is the first step […] more than this could not be expected.‘96 
    As for Griffith, it has often been suggested that he signed the Treaty on account of 
Lloyd George‘s dramatic ultimatum on 5 December calling for the signing of the 
agreement or the renewal of war. Although such an ultimatum may have intimidated 
some into signing (possibly Collins), it must be appreciated that what was achieved under 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty was remarkably close to what Griffith had originally envisaged 
under his dual monarchy concept. Ireland would be free to self-govern whilst still 
retaining links with Britain, albeit that the country would not become a separate kingdom.   
 
15) Observations 
  
The period between July and December 1921 saw the first cracks appear within Sinn 
Féin, with the different aspirations of the four figures starting to become more evident. 
The physical separation of Griffith and Collins from de Valera and Brugha in Dublin 
helped to widen the ideological gap between their own approaches. Without directly 
engaging in the negotiations Brugha stuck to the ―rock of republicanism‖, willing to risk 
renewed war (buoyed by his own personal judgment that by December 1921 the IRA was 
in a stronger position to fight than six months earlier) rather than compromise the 
republic he was prepared to sacrifice his life for.
97
 De Valera meanwhile sought to 
maintain unity between idealists such as Brugha, and realists such as Collins and Griffith, 
but in the process of keeping this unity, the president‘s own views regarding the republic 
remained obscured (with him inclined towards the idea of external association). To 
Collins and Griffith however, meeting the British face-to-face brought home the realities 
of the situation. Although the Irish had achieved much in bringing the British to the 
negotiating table, they were still dealing with one of the foremost global powers, who 
were not going to bow down to Irish demands with ease.  
    As for de Valera and Collins, this period also marked the first strains on their 
friendship. Whereas in the period between 1916 and 1921 the men had been close allies, 
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it now seemed as though this was being lost. Many have argued that de Valera used 
Collins as a scapegoat to save himself from the unpleasant task of quashing dreams of an 
Irish Republic (certainly Collins himself was recorded as thinking this). Although there 
may be some semblance of truth to this, as previously noted, to purely take this stance 
also ignores the logic of de Valera‘s strategy; had the plenipotentiaries fulfilled their 
obligation to refer back to the Cabinet for approval, then Collins would not have found 
himself in the position whereby some labeled him as a traitor. When passing judgement 
on de Valera‘s conduct, the limiting of the delegates‘ powers, coupled with indecision 
over the best course of action regarding Ulster and a refusal to attend the talks in person, 
all of this suggests a man who was not fully secure in his own approach or of his own 
position. Upon becoming president de Valera had chosen to distance himself from Anglo-
Irish negotiations, without appreciating the impact this would have on his influence over 
the other key figures. By the time he realised his misjudgement it was too late; an 
agreement had been signed and it was not he, but rather Collins and Griffith, who many 
amongst the Irish populace believed were bringing freedom and independence back to the 
country. 
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Part III: The Treaty Debates 
 
 
Between 14 December 1921 and 10 January 1922 the terms of the agreement signed in 
London were deliberated by members of the Dáil, with the Treaty approved on the 7 
January by a narrow margin of 64 votes to 57. This outcome emphasised just how 
divisive the terms of the settlement were to Irish politicians, with Michael Hopkinson 
arguing that it was the decisive event which led to the Irish Civil War: ‗No document 
could have more effectively brought out into the open divisions in the philosophy and 
leadership of the Sinn Féin movement.‘98 Whereas it is true that the movement had 
become irrevocably divided, were this and the signing of the Treaty instrumental in 
creating the right conditions for internal conflict? This part of the research examines the 
utterances of the four men during the debates, looking at what aspects of the Treaty 
caused them and other members of parliament to split into two groups.  
 
16) Questions regarding the conduct of the plenipotentiaries 
 
The proceedings began with much debate over whether the plenipotentiaries had 
exceeded their powers in signing the agreement with the British, in particular their 
reneging on de Valera‘s clear instruction to submit any draft treaty to the Cabinet in 
Dublin and await a reply before signing.
99
 Collins and Griffith were quick to point out 
that what they had signed did not bind Ireland to the Treaty, since it would have to be 
ratified by the Dáil (as well as by the British government) in order for it to take effect.
100
 
The initial stages of the Treaty Debates were also spent discussing what the 
plenipotentiaries had been expected to secure for Ireland, namely the republic. Both 
Griffith and Collins argued that this demand had not once been explicitly put in writing, 
the latter noting that the British communication on 29 September 1921 had made it clear 
that the Irish were entering into a conference not on the recognition of the Irish Republic: 
‗If we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we 
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could very easily have said so, and there would have been no Conference […] it was the 
acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise.‘101 As already touched upon, 
although men such as Collins sometimes failed to specifically mention the term 
―republic‖, there was no misunderstanding that a republic is what Sinn Féin strove for. 
Therefore, although Collins and Griffith were technically right to observe that the word 
―republic‖ had not been mentioned in documentation or made an express objective of the 
plenipotentiaries, they could not ignore the fact that the Treaty compromised many of the 
ideals fellow colleagues had been fighting for, as well as the republic that had been 
founded in January 1919. 
    As previous discussed, Collins regarded the Treaty as a stepping stone to eventual Irish 
independence (which indeed would be the case), stating: ‗In my opinion it gives us 
freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, but the freedom 
to achieve it‘.102 During the debates Griffith also used this line of argument: ‗It does not 
for ever bind us not to ask for any more […] in the meantime we can move on in comfort 
and peace to the ultimate goal.‘103 As the Irish Independent article from November 1917 
also indicates, he had publicly stated that he would not hesitate in adopting a phased 
approach to seeking full independence, if circumstances permitted this. On the other 
hand, Griffith did not disguise his own belief that so long as freedom was assured, he did 
not object to remaining affiliated with the British Empire: ‗I do not care whether the King 
of England or the symbol of the Crown be in Ireland so long as the people of Ireland are 
free to shape their own destinies.‘104 Although such a view was far-removed from those 
of hardliners such as Brugha, Griffith supported his own position by reminding the 
members of the House that unlike Brugha (as well as de Valera), the plenipotentiaries had 
not refused to attend the talks in London, even though they could of shirked the 
responsibility.
105
 De Valera robustly defended his choice not to attend the talks by 
claiming that aside from believing his absence would allow for a stronger tactical 
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position
106
, he ‗wanted to keep that symbol of the Republic pure even from insinuation—
lest any word across the table from me would, in any sense, give away the Republic.‘107 
Yet at the same time he also sought to clarify that he had never been solely a republican: 
‗I never made a statement that I was altogether for the Republic or nothing. I was careful 
on that point if you go through anything I have said at any time. I have been perfectly 
consistent. I have been classed as a moderate. […] I believe I am a moderate.‘108 The 
president was now seemingly claiming that he had never been a committed republican, 
thus publicly exposing the suggestible political approach he in reality held. One could 
view such behaviour as political manoeuvring aimed at securing his own position, with 
one observer of de Valera‘s performance during the debates (the pro-Treaty Sinn Féin 
member Piaras Béaslaí) opining: 
 
Having used every device of a practised politician to gain his point, having shown 
himself relentless and unscrupulous in taking every advantage of generous 
opponents, he would adopt a tone of injured innocence when his shots failed, and 
assume the pose of a simple, sensitive man, too guileless and gentle for this rough 
world of politics.
109
 
 
It would appear that the president was using the debates not just to get the Treaty 
rejected, but also to reaffirm his own dominance and to regain some of the initiative he 
had lost to Griffith and Collins. He would do this by presenting a new treaty proposal, 
known as Document No. 2. 
 
17) Document No. 2 
 
Document No. 2 was a proposal for external association, a concept which in itself was 
not new, having first been suggested in September 1921. In essence, the Irish Republic 
would be externally associated with the British Empire, with the British monarch as head 
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of the associated states, including Ireland.
110  
It was a bold attempt to bridge the divide 
that had enveloped the Dáil but ultimately it was still a compromise akin to the treaty 
already signed. The principle difference was that Document No. 2 would permit an Irish 
Republic, albeit still with formal ties to the British Empire. In spite of the fact this new 
proposal was still a compromise, de Valera argued that it was a republican document 
(even though it contained no explicit reference to an Irish Republic), so as to garnish 
support from hardliners such as Brugha.
111
 During the Treaty negotiations Brugha had 
written:  
 
We are prepared to recommend our people that the accepted head of Great Britain 
be recognised as the head of the new association. We are prepared to co-operate 
with them, and send a representative to, whatever council is appointed to conduct 
the affairs of the group. In matters that do not affect the group we continue to act 
independently; our form of government remains the same as at present, and can 
only be altered by the Irish people themselves.
112
 
 
Given that Brugha was a devout republican, it leaves one questioning what made him 
agree to such a proposal. Document No. 2 did not require members of the Dáil to swear 
an oath of faithfulness to the British Monarch; instead the document merely stated: ‗That, 
for the purposes of the Association, Ireland shall recognise His Britannic Majesty as head 
of the Association.‘113 This was the crucial difference for Brugha and men of his mindset. 
Their opposition to the Treaty was that Irish citizens would be willfully accepting 
themselves to be British subjects and would voluntarily take the oath of allegiance to the 
English King.
114
 With Document No. 2 however, Brugha stated in the debates: 
 
We are prepared to enter into an agreement, an association with the British 
Commonwealth of Nations as it is generally called, on the same or similar lines as 
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that on which one business firm enters into combination with another or several 
others. […] We are prepared, on the same terms, to enter into an association with 
the British Commonwealth of Nations, and for the purposes of that combination we 
are prepared to recognise the English Government as the head of the 
combination.
115
 
 
One could argue that had Collins or Griffith produced such a document, Brugha would 
not have so easily put forward his backing, given his aforementioned distrust towards 
both gentlemen. However, to believe that he offered support for external association 
merely because de Valera was its architect would be too simplistic a conclusion. During 
one session of the debates, Griffith had spoken of the slight difference in language used 
in the Treaty compared with Document No. 2, but as Costello notes, what for Griffith was 
a mere ‗quibble‘ of words116, ‗Brugha saw as the basis for justifying a major schism, not 
only within the ranks of Sinn Féin, but within Ireland itself‘.117 Although de Valera‘s 
proposal withdrew any explicit oath of allegiance to the British Crown, the rest of the 
terms were criticised by opponents as being too vague in detail. Writing after the Treaty 
had been ratified, Collins argued that de Valera‘s proposal would have committed Ireland 
‗to an association so vague that it might afford grounds for claims by Britain which might 
give her an opportunity to press for control in Irish affairs as ‗common concerns‘, and to 
use, or to threaten to use, force‘.118 By this, Collins was referring to the section of the 
document which stated that Ireland would ‗exist in association with the States of the 
British Commonwealth for the purposes of common concern, such as defence, peace and 
war and political treaties‘.119 Although the terms of the agreement were restrictive, the 
Treaty was arguably more secure in that it placed Ireland on an equal footing with the 
other Dominions, who according to Coogan ‗would have a vested interest in preventing 
Britain from setting a precedent for Imperial meddling‘.120 The proposal itself was 
introduced on 15 December 1921 in a private session of the Dáil, but the historian John 
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Regan argues that such an early introduction ‗had a catalytic effect on the debate, by 
further polarising opposing sides and clarifying that the choice […] was between the Free 
State and the republic, and in absolute terms war and peace‘.121 De Valera is reported to 
have commented about his proposal: ‗It is my last effort […] and it is a poor one. It is 
only a bad best.‘122 Such a comment reflects the difficulty in trying to develop a solution 
which catered for all the different interests group that made-up Sinn Féin. Towards the 
end of the debates de Valera made the following statement regarding the opposing views 
of hard-line republicans and moderates:  
 
I had a difficult task to play for four years, to try, so to speak, to hold the balance 
even in public discussion, no matter what my own personal views might be; and 
privately, and certainly in public never did I do anything which would tend to lead 
to the disruption of these two forces.
123
 
This statement is particularly noteworthy in that he infers to how his own opinions were 
seemingly veiled by his efforts to keep all sides happy. This can help to explain why he 
often either contradicted himself on past comments or appeared to backtrack on certain 
ideas. Nevertheless, when first putting forth in the Dáil his proposal for external 
association, he claimed this had always been his intention: ‗There is a question […] of 
whether we stand for the Republic or not. I said from the start we stood for external 
association. I was always for external association.‘124 This had first come to light in a 
letter he wrote to Lloyd George on 10 August 1921 when he suggested a ‗free 
association‘ between Ireland and the British Commonwealth, a proposal which was 
rejected by the Prime Minister on numerous occasions during the negotiations.
125
 For its 
time, it was a visionary concept (and one that would be implemented later on by other 
Commonwealth members) but different factions within the Dáil were collectively 
unwilling to seriously consider the idea. Although de Valera and Brugha believed it 
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would satisfy (fellow) hard-line republicans, it actually served more to divide rather than 
unite these hardliners, with many sticking firmly to the solid rock of the isolated republic, 
unwilling to accept a compromise of any kind.
126
 As for those members in support of the 
Treaty, the difference between Document No. 2 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty was so 
marginal that it furthered their resolve to implement the agreement already signed in 
London. The difference in words would be no justification for a renewal of hostilities.  
18) The issue of partition 
 
When one looks at the political schism caused by the Treaty, it is of note how little the 
partition of Ireland was discussed in the debates. The creation of Northern Ireland 
(consisting of the six counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and 
Tyrone) had been brought into effect in May 1921. A Northern Government with Sir 
James Craig as its Prime Minister now sat in Belfast, a government representing a 
Protestant and Unionist majority at odds with the aspirations represented by those sitting 
in the Dáil. Attempts to win-round the support of Northern loyalists were hindered by the 
South‘s cultural and economic philosophy, with its emphasis on Gaelic revivalism, 
economic protectionism and the Catholic Church.
127
 Although partition was physically 
concocted by the British, these southern policies only sought to entrench the internal 
division of Ireland in the psyche of some Irishmen. In addition, the pro-Treaty IRA 
member Eoin O‘Duffy claimed that the position of Nationalists in Northern Ireland was 
treated with complete indifference by the rest of Ireland, expect at Election time, or when 
it served party purposes to exploit it.
128
 The question is why was the partition of Ireland 
not the foremost concern of the four men, but rather the oath recognising the British 
Crown? 
    For de Valera, as for the other three gentlemen, the partitioning of Ireland was 
naturally not an outcome which he favoured. His first views regarding the Northern 
question can be traced back to his American tour, in which he affirmed that ‗this Ulster is 
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a thing of the mind only, non-existent in the world of reality‘.129 Such a comment can be 
interpreted as an attempt to strike against British propaganda, which was attempting to 
accentuate the political and religious differences within Ireland, so as to legitimise their 
decision to bring about partition. On the other hand, for de Valera to dismiss the issue of 
Ulster as ‗non-existent in the world of reality‘ was to gloss-over the very real polarisation 
that had fostered itself between Ulstermen and the rest of their fellow Irishmen. It was 
evident that the Six Counties would not be willing to join with the rest of Ireland without 
retaining some degree of independence and so de Valera put forth suggestions that would 
see an autonomous rather than partitioned Northern Ireland. One such plan, mentioned 
during his time in the United States, was to suggest the creation of a federalised Irish 
Republic, akin to the American model: ‗It is certainly a project I would be ready to 
support – we would divide the island into four little States so that we might have greater 
decentralization of government.‘130 Another option, as outlined in an interview with the 
Neue Zeitung newspaper in May 1921, was to allow Northern Ireland to exist in its 
current state, but to make it subordinate to the parliament in Dublin rather than London: 
 
Provided the unity and independence of Ireland is preserved, we are ready to give 
such local autonomy to Ulster, or to any other part of Ireland, as would be 
practicable, if it would make for the contentment and satisfaction of the citizens 
resident there. I feel certain that the Republic would be ready to give to the Six 
Counties […] far more substantial powers than those they are to possess under the 
British Partition Act.
131
 
 
As with his earlier comparison with the Platt Amendment, de Valera‘s views regarding 
Ulster show that he was more imaginative and suggestible to certain issues than his 
outward persona implied. One has to read very carefully into what he would say, such as 
in his message to Lloyd George dated 10 August 1921. Despite decrying British attempts 
to ―mutilate‖ the country in order to satisfy a small minority, de Valera also stated: ‗We 
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do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a 
complete reconciliation. We agree with you ―that no common action can be secured by 
force.‖'132 With a Northern parliament already established, de Valera‘s pledge not to use 
coercion therefore meant that he was resigning himself to the likelihood that partition 
would remain in force after a peace agreement was reached with the British. This came 
despite the fact that just eleven days earlier in a personal letter to Jan Smuts he stated: 
‗Unless the North East comes in on some reasonable basis no further progress can be 
made. An Ireland in fragments nobody cares about. A unified Ireland alone can be happy 
or prosperous.‘133 The reason why de Valera was not willing to use coercion against the 
North could be attributed to several factors. Practicality almost certainly influenced such 
a conclusion; having been strained by their campaign against the British, the IRA would 
not be in an ideal position to wage a war against the Six Counties for the present time. 
Secondly though, to use force against the North would directly contradict the values de 
Valera had been espousing ever since the Easter Rising. He had been arguing Ireland‘s 
case for freedom on the principle of people‘s right to self-determination and so to force 
Unionists to align with the South would be characteristic of the oppression the new state 
sought to banish. Thus the only viable option left open to de Valera was diplomacy, 
although he wanted this to be firmly in the control of Dublin rather than Westminster. 
When he put forth his alternative to the Treaty, his Document No. 2 tried to defuse the 
Northern question by treating it as an internal Irish affair, albeit that ‗in the sincere regard 
for peace‘ he was once again acknowledging the reality of partition.134 
    In the case of Michael Collins, despite having signed a settlement in which Ireland 
remained partitioned, he made clear his belief that partition was a hindrance to the 
nation‘s future, noting that ‗union must come first, unity first as a means to full 
freedom‘.135 In his 1922 publication The Path to Freedom, Collins outlined:  
 
If they join in, the Six Counties will certainly have a generous measure of local 
autonomy. If they stay out, the decision of the Boundary Commission, arranged for 
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in clause 12, would be certain to deprive ‗Ulster‘ of Fermanagh and Tyrone. Shorn 
of those counties, she would shrink into insignificance. The burdens and financial 
restrictions of the Partition Act will remain on North-East Ulster if she decides to 
stay out. No lightening of these burdens or restrictions can be effected by the 
English Parliament without the consent of Ireland. Thus, union is certain. The only 
question for North-East Ulster is – How soon?136 
 
If these aforementioned areas had have been transferred to the South, the area left 
separated in the North (namely Belfast and her environs) would not in the long term be 
economically viable in the eyes of Collins. Thus the South would not have to devote 
much time and energy to the Northern question – economics rather than persuasion or 
coercion would secure national unity. Yet in spite of Collins‘ public faith in a future 
Boundary Commission, Lord Birkenhead (who was a member of the British negotiation 
team and formed an unlikely friendship with Collins) rejected Collins‘ claims that the 
Boundary Commission would transfer large tracts of Northern Ireland to the South. In a 
letter to Arthur Balfour, Birkenhead argued that Collins was likely to have made the 
claim to garner support for his position on the Treaty and that in reality the claim had ‗no 
foundation whatsoever except in his overheated imagination‘.137 In addition, Kevin 
O‘Shiel (a member of the Southern Boundary Commission) said in May 1923 that in 
private Collins ‗never made any secret of his distrust in the Boundary Commission as a 
means of a settlement per se‘.138  Behind the scenes, Collins did plan for an eventuality 
whereby northern areas would not be transferred to the Irish Free State. For instance, in 
April 1922 he involved himself in plans to dispatch a large consignment of arms to IRA 
divisions north of the border but ineffective communications between these divisions 
meant the offensive proved a failure.
139
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    The position of Brugha with regards to the North is not readily documented, although 
given his unswerving objective of a united Irish Republic, it can be surmised that unity at 
all costs was in his mind. During the Treaty Debates he made the following comment: 
You may go ahead with your Treaty and your Southern Parliament, but as far as we 
are concerned we are not going to co-operate with you, but we are not going to 
hamper you. Go ahead, but we are certainly going to see, so far as we can help it, 
that Dáil Eireann remains in existence until the electorate turns it down.
140
 
Although he does not explicitly mention Ulster, his reference to the Southern Parliament 
and his determination to stand by Dáil Eireann does illustrate the difference he 
recognised between the two bodies; only did the latter stand for the whole of Ireland. As 
for Arthur Griffith, it is evident that he was more pre-occupied with ―essential unity‖ 
rather than securing a republic, as his original concept for an Anglo-Irish dual monarchy 
testified. According to Ernest Blythe (born in the northern county of Antrim), although 
Griffith had at one point during the negotiations belittled the British about their ignorance 
of key statistics regarding Ulster
141, Griffith himself ‗was as completely ignorant of 
Northern conditions as the ordinary average Southerner who has never spent any time in 
the north-eastern area‘.142 In spite of a questionable awareness of Northern conditions, 
coupled with his approval of a Treaty affirming partition, this is not to say that he was 
less committed to reunifying Ireland as the other men. Robert Barton (who emphasised 
that Collins and Griffith were not partitionists) noted that Griffith shared Collins‘ belief 
that economics would dictate the position of Northern Ireland: ‗Griffith so often 
exclaimed, ‗Well, if the North refuses to come in, we will have a boundary commission, 
and they will lose half their territory, and they cannot stay out‘. Over and over again he 
made that statement.‘143 Thus, although he had put his name to an agreement which 
secured the partition of Ireland, Griffith shared Collins‘ view that this would be a 
temporary arrangement, that even with a Boundary Commission still allowing for the 
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existence of a separated northern state, economics would eventually force that state to 
merge with the South. Upon reflection however, this (self-) assurance that the 
commission would rule in favour of the Free State seems curiously misguided. Article 
twelve of the Treaty stated that any future commission would determine a boundary ‗in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with 
economic and geographic conditions‘, a rather vague statement.144 The commission 
would consist of three persons; one from the Irish Free State, one from Northern Ireland 
and one from Great Britain. The key to any ruling would be how the vote was organised. 
If a simple nationwide plebiscite were carried out in Northern Ireland, then it would more 
than likely rule in favour of remaining part of the United Kingdom, on account that the 
majority of the population was (protestant) Unionists. On the other hand, the Free State 
only stood a chance of gaining the nationalist areas of Ulster if a vote were carried out on 
a more localised scale, such as by electoral divisions. One aide of Griffith recalled:   
I pointed out to him that I considered that the clause was too vague and that it left 
too much power to the Boundary Commission. I suggested that some unit (such as a 
Barony or Electoral Division) should be specified, that a vote should be taken in 
such a unit and that the unit should automatically come to us or stay in the North 
according to the majority of the votes. He immediately saw the point, but said he 
did not know whether it would be possible at that stage to have the clause 
altered.
145
 
In the end the Treaty did not stipulate precisely how any future commission would 
determine a boundary in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. In addition, the 
researcher K. Rankin argues that ‗it was a fallacy to assume that sheer physical size 
would dictate the economic viability of the North, as it was not a separate state but part of 
the United Kingdom‘.146 Although the benefit of hindsight allows one to reflect upon 
opinions that reunification would be a foregone conclusion as slightly naïve, given that 
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partition had only been enacted in 1921 it was understandable that many members of the 
Dáil believed that the partition of Ireland could be easily reversed, even if the issues 
behind its introduction were to take longer to rectify. Yet upon the ratification of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in January 1922, Ireland remained divided, with the rather ironic 
result being that the North now had Home Rule, the only part of the country which had 
not campaigned for such powers. A month later, the new president, Arthur Griffith, re-
affirmed that although logically possessing the right, the Free State would not coerce the 
North:  
It is a matter, not of logic, but of practical politics. It is governed by that letter of 
President de Valera to Mr. Lloyd George in which he declared he would not coerce 
Unionist Ulster. We shall not coerce Unionist Ulster, but equally we shall not 
permit Nationalist Ulster to be coerced. Against that part of Ulster which votes 
itself out of the Free State we shall not use force.
147
 
Hence the border remained unaltered and so the boundary concocted by the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act is the very one which remains to this day. 
19) Observations 
 
The debates revealed that under the banner of Sinn Féin there existed two broad 
groupings – realists and idealists. D. Akenson argues that the latter were republicans, 
unbounded by the pleasantries of constitutional politics and preferring ‗to fight the holy 
war for their republic rather than obtain peace by compromising their ideal.‘148 One could 
place Brugha in such a category; during the debates he was accused by the politician 
Sean Milroy of disliking the Treaty because he disliked peace.
149
 The Minister for 
Defence on the other hand argued that he felt that the republic was within reach, but that 
the plenipotentiaries had compromised this by resigning themselves to British proposals: 
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From the way these people over in England were yielding to us, I was beginning to 
believe that we might come to an arrangement which would be satisfactory to 
everyone […] that we could come to an arrangement without any fighting but I am 
afraid that this thing which has happened within the last fortnight makes a fight 
inevitable.
150
  
Such words however were spoken by a man who had not been exposed to the pressures of 
the British delegation, notably Lloyd George‘s ultimatum of peace or war. Whereas 
Collins would later claim that he had been unperturbed by the ultimatum since he did not 
regard it as genuine, Griffith admitted in the debates that he did not believe that the Prime 
Minister was bluffing.
151
 Griffith also sought to ―defend‖ the actions of the Irish 
delegation by arguing that had they not signed the agreement and thus re-committed the 
nation to war, the Irish public would have questioned why this was so.
152
 As for de 
Valera, whose position hovered between that of an idealist and a realist, the academic 
David Fitzpatrick comments: ‗At the heart of the confusion among all factions was the 
paradox that de Valera, the suspected moderate with his reiterated disavowal of 
‗doctrinaire republicanism‘, had exchanged roles with Collins, the supposed diehard.‘153 
This was partly a result of the exposure of agendas the men had kept disclosed in the 
years beforehand; in the case of Collins, that he was not committed to the republic at all 
costs (wanting to avoid renewed war if it could he helped). De Valera meanwhile was 
now placing himself firmly within the republican camp, having previously shown himself 
to have been considering other political options (albeit in private).  
    The four politicians were now firmly divided over Ireland‘s future – Collins and 
Griffith in support of the Irish Free State, with de Valera and Brugha continuing to 
recognise the Irish Republic.  Although this divide would form the opposing sides in the 
civil war, were these personal differences a direct cause of later internal conflict? To 
ascertain the root cause of such conflict it is necessary to also look at public reaction to 
                                               
150 Cathal Brugha, ―Debate Vol. T No. 4‖, Dáil Éireann, 16 December 1921, Source: Houses of the 
Oireachtas [online, accessed 1 November 2012]. 
151 Collins, The Path to Freedom, p. 31. 
152
 Griffith, ―Debate Vol. T No. 2‖, Dáil Éireann, 14 December 1921. 
153 David Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland’s Irish Revolution (Cork: Cork University Press, 2003), pp. 258-259. 
 55 
 
the Treaty; to see whether the public was as firmly polarised as their elected 
representatives.
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Part IV: Public opinion towards the Treaty 
 
 
So far, the focus has been on the personal thoughts of de Valera, Collins, Griffith and 
Brugha. Returning to one of the key questions of this paper, was the men‘s divide over 
the Treaty a reflection of general opinion or did their political split help to create public 
tensions that would ultimately lead to civil war? This final part concentrates on the 
public‘s opinion of the Treaty. One of the most effective ways to ascertain their views is 
to look at how the press covered events – did the press help to shape public attitudes? 
 
20) Public opinion in the period April 1916 – July 1921 
 
When the Treaty was debated in the Dáil, one of the main counter-arguments used by 
those opposed to the agreement was that the Irish people had endorsed a republic, which 
de Valera concluded could only be de-established by the people. In the UK general 
election of December 1918 Sinn Féin had obtained a landslide victory, winning 73 out of 
105 Irish parliamentary seats on a mandate of creating a republic. Following the harsh 
repressions by the British authorities in the wake of the Easter Rising (coupled with their 
attempt to introduce conscription in 1918), people became more receptive of calls for 
independence. On the other hand, the possibility exists that some voted for Sinn Féin, not 
because they explicitly desired a republic, but because they did desire Irish self-
governance and thus used the election as a protest vote against the British. The Sinn Féin 
politician Roger Sweetman (elected to the Dáil in the 1918 election but who stood down 
in 1921), wrote to the Irish Independent in December 1921 arguing: 
 
There has not been a contested election for the Dail since December 1918, and I 
think it would be a bold person who would contend that the electorate then gave a 
mandate for a Republic sans phrase. There has been no election (contested or 
otherwise) since the truce and the subsequent offer of the British Government, 
which pair of events, I think, so transformed the situation that it is even more 
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difficult than before for Dail members to suggest that the majority of their 
constituents are Republicans sans phrase.
154
 
 
Such a ‗bold person‘ described by Sweetman would have included Cathal Brugha, who 
stood by the 1916 Easter Rising Proclamation: ‗We hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as 
a sovereign independent state, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in 
arms to the cause of its freedom.‘155 As the historian Michael Laffan writes, ‗IRA men 
had made sacrifices in fighting for their beloved republic and they would not allow their 
gains to be frittered away by civilians, however numerous these might be‘.156 For these 
men the results of the 1918 election were enough to satisfy them; a majority share of the 
vote had been cast in favour of Sinn Féin‘s mandate of a republic, a wish which the new 
Irish Free State could not fulfill. De Valera on the other hand, although an advocate of the 
republic, was not of the same fixed mindset. Interviewed in May 1921 he stated 
publically that although ‗the Irish people in the last elections declared unequivocally for 
the Irish Republic‘, at the same time he also added that ‗if the Irish people at any time 
wish to change their constitution or form of government, it is, of course, their right to do 
so‘.157 The president had even said in August 1921 that he and his Cabinet were not 
‗Republican doctrinaires‘.158 Some members of the Dáil argued that the election results 
signaled more of a public desire for independence rather than necessarily a republic, with 
Robert Barton surmising that ‗great numbers of people were not Republicans […] they 
were sympathetic but not sincere Republicans. They suffered willingly and gave the 
Republican leadership enthusiastic support because public opinion and patriotism 
demanded it and because the Irish Army could punish as well as the English.‘159 Arthur 
Griffith meanwhile made the following statement during the Treaty Debates:  
I am told that the people of Ireland elected us to get a Republic. They elected us in 
1918 to get rid of the Parliamentary Party; they elected us in 1921 as a gesture, a 
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proper gesture of defiance to the Black-and-Tans: they elected us, not as doctrinaire 
Republicans, but as men looking for freedom and independence.
160
 
To truly decipher whether these men‘s utterances were attempts to ―cover‖ their own 
actions in signing away the Irish Republic, or were their genuine beliefs is challenging. 
What can be deciphered however from Barton‘s statement, is that the Irish public did not 
necessarily lead the call for secession from the United Kingdom, with him also adding: 
‗To the outside observer the demand for complete independence may have appeared to 
spring from the people; in reality the people were infused by the leaders and the strength 
of the National demand.‘161 D. Harkness identifies a difference between how people 
defined true freedom: ‗To some, freedom and a ‗Republic‘ had become synonymous; to 
others less doctrinaire, and anxious only to be rid of England so that the Irish people 
could pronounce its voice, freedom meant freedom to choose.‘162 This divide was 
exemplified not only by the four individuals under scrutiny, but was also applicable to the 
general public and the IRA. Following the hardships of the War of Independence, many 
ordinary Irishmen were likely acceptant of the Treaty not necessarily because they 
heartedly approved of it, but because it would bring about a return to normality. To those 
in the IRA however, having been tarnished with the label of ―murder gangs‖ and seen 
many of their comrades killed, they were now expected to be acceptant of a Treaty in 
which Ireland would still have a British King, along with a British presence in some of 
her ports and the separation of her compatriots in the North. Little wonder that many 
members had become indifferent to the cost of continued warfare.
163
 
 
21) The attitudes of the public and the press towards the Treaty 
 
With the Irish public questionably not as wholeheartedly committed to a republic as the 
election results of 1918 (along with some hard-line republicans) suggested, how did they 
regard the Treaty? At the same time as politicians were deliberating over the agreement, a 
broad swath of public bodies from across the country reported their approval, ranging 
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from labour and farmer‘s organisations, to Chambers of Commerce and perhaps most 
crucially (given the importance and influence of religion in Irish society), members of the 
Catholic Church.
164
 Michael Hopkinson suggests that such broad support existed because 
of the composition of the Dáil, whose members were often Sinn Féin and IRA activists, 
rather than for instance Southern Unionists or individuals representing labour interests.
165
 
This would thus suggest that the ―voice‖ of the Dáil was not necessarily in sync with that 
of the Irish people, a fear expressed by one member of the public in a letter to the Irish 
Independent: ‗If the members of the Dail do not voice the wishes of the constituents then 
they misrepresent those who sent them there.‘166 Whereas this would suggest that the 
division amongst members of the Dáil was at odds with their constituents, the support of 
public bodies and institutions in favour of the Treaty was merely a generalised parameter 
of public opinion. The first detailed record of public opinion on the Treaty was the Irish 
general election of 16 June 1922 (which for the first time Sinn Féin contested as a 
disunited grouping). In the six months between the Treaty‘s ratification by the Dáil and 
the public vote, tensions between pro- and anti-Treaty forces had not lessened, despite 
talks between de Valera and Collins, as well as the latter‘s attempts to heal the rift within 
the IRA. In March 1922 de Valera had founded a new republican party, Cumann na 
Poblachta (with Brugha as its vice-president). He also toured the country, giving a series 
of vitriolic speeches, in which he prophesied freedom would not be achieved through the 
Treaty but by wading through the blood of fellow Irishmen. These speeches however 
were interpreted by some as an incitement to civil war; even though de Valera withdrew 
from making such comments when accused of inciting violence, it is hard to say with 
certainty whether or not they had any effect on tensions during the period. In the election 
itself, a total of 58 pro-Treaty Sinn Féin candidates (led by Collins) were elected, as were 
35 anti-Treaty candidates (led by de Valera), representing 38.5% and 21.3% of the vote 
respectively.
167
 In addition, 35 candidates (including independents and members of the 
Labour and Farmers‘ parties) were also elected, broadly in support of the Treaty. 
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Although the election result represented a majority support for the Treaty (only in Sligo 
and East Mayo did anti-Treaty candidates win a majority of the votes), it represented 
neither strong public confidence in the Provisional Government (created at the beginning 
of 1922, coexisting with rather than replacing Dáil Éireann), nor a clear disapproval of 
republican values.
168
 This turn of events contrasted with press accounts during the time of 
the Treaty Debates, with the press at both a local and a national level being almost 
unanimous in supporting the settlement.
169
 This had been a crucial asset to the 
plenipotentiaries, providing them with the ideal platform on which to convince the Irish 
people that they had made the right decision in London. The fact that even many 
nationalists and republicans were purportedly acceptant of the Treaty was reported 
widely in the press as further proof that hardliners were out of touch with the general 
public: 
 
Every hour that passes sees the wave of approval for the Anglo-Irish Peace Treaty 
increase in volume and in force. The Irish people has spoken in no uncertain voice, 
whether through the medium of its local representatives or through the more direct, 
but no less unanimous, medium of the parish assembly. More than a dozen county 
councils, a score of Sinn Fein executives, and numerous other representative bodies 
have declared for the Treaty.
170
 
 
Such tones were prevalent even in pro-republican papers such as the Meath Chronicle, 
which affirmed that although a republic was desirable, they believed that senior 
politicians (perhaps with the exception of Brugha) had already concluded that an Irish 
Republic, standing in rigid isolation, was not practical.
171
 With this in mind, de Valera‘s 
refusal to accept the Treaty was frequently criticised by the press, on account of widely 
reported public support for the agreement. The Irish Times for example implied on one 
occasion that the president was obstructing the people‘s will, by affirming: ‗We believe, 
the vast majority of Southern Irishmen have accepted it [the treaty] with joy [...] now Mr 
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de Valera steps between Ireland and her hopes.‘172 Meanwhile the Freeman’s Journal 
spoke of de Valera‘s increasingly autocratic behavior and ‗his defiance of the people‘s 
demand for the Treaty‘, part of his attempt to ‗carry the devastating split as far as his 
influence could reach‘: ‗His political formula has, in his mind, taken the place of the 
nation. The ―external association‖ which he would like but cannot get, has obsessed him 
to the exclusion of the fate of millions of our people. The formalists have forgotten the 
men, women, and children who compose the nation.‘173 At one point during the debates,  
Griffith reminding members: ‗We are here, not as the dictators of the Irish people, but as 
the representatives of the Irish people.‘174 The president simply retorted: ‗A war-weary 
people will take things which are not in accordance with their aspirations‘, implying that 
the British threat of renewed war hung over the minds of many, thus accounting for their 
support of the Treaty.
175
  
    In stark contrast to de Valera, Collins and Griffith were often portrayed in a positive 
manner by the press, whom depicted them as having orchestrated a peaceful outcome to 
Anglo-Irish tensions. One paper, the Kilkenny People, said of the two:  ‗We have no 
hesitation in saying, when it is a question of pronouncing judgement on the Peace Treaty, 
that what is good enough for Mr. Arthur Griffith and Mr. Michael Collins is good enough 
for us.‘176 Although this was a perfectly valid opinion, it serves to highlight the 
limitations of press accounts of the day. This particular example for instance does not 
make mention of whether such a sentiment was shared by the local populace in this part 
of Ireland. Dorothory Macardle outlines how the press was guilty of misrepresenting true 
public opinion: ‗Public bodies which showed a majority for acceptance were reported as 
favouring it ―unanimously.‖ Letters supporting it were published at full length […] all 
warnings against the Treaty, all cautions as to the dangers latent in it, all opposition to 
                                               
172 The Irish Times, 9 December 1921 [cited in Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green: The Irish Civil 
War (Dublin: Gil & Macmillan Ltd., 1988), p.35]. 
173 ―Attitude of Mr. de Valera‖, Freeman’s Journal, 5 January 1922, p.4, Source: Irish Newspaper Archives 
[online, accessed 15 November 2012]. 
174
 Griffith, ―Debate Vol. T No. 6‖, Dáil Éireann, 19 December 1921. 
175 Eamon de Valera, ―Debate Vol. T No. 6‖, Dáil Éireann, 19 December 1921, Source: Houses of the 
Oireachtas [online, accessed 1 November 2012]. 
176 ―The Irish Free State‖, Kilkenny People, 10 December 1921 (Kilkenny, Ireland). 
  
62 
 
Partition, even, seemed flung to the winds.‘177 One example of such reporting can be 
identified in a piece from the Ulster Herald in December 1921, which affirmed: 
‗Throughout the North-West Nationalist opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of the 
Treaty […] at the public meetings held the demand for ratification had been practically 
unanimous.‘178 The tone of such comments would imply that nationalists were more than 
obliging to accept the Treaty, which was not necessarily the case. Published just a few 
days later, the Freeman’s Journal gave an account of proceedings at the Tyrone County 
Council:  
 
Mr. A.B. Donnelly (chairman), proposed the following resolution:- ‗That we, the 
Tyrone Co. Council, whilst fully realising that the Anglo-Irish Treaty does not 
satisfy the rightful claim of the nation to complete freedom, feel nevertheless that, 
inasmuch as it gives the Irish Free State full control of all vital national affairs, it 
provides such opportunities for national development as will eventually secure us 
the full measure of our rights and bring about an enduring peace between the 
people of Ireland and Great Britain.
179
 
 
This extract indicates how support for the Treaty was quite often dictated by pragmatism 
rather than enthusiasm. In addition to using selective language, the press also used 
debatable figures to back up their claims that the public were almost unanimous in their 
pro-Treaty stance. A correspondent (based in Galway) writing for the Freeman’s Journal 
and the Connacht Tribune, on 27 December 1921 wrote ‗it is probably true to say that 95 
per cent of responsible opinion in Co. Galway favours acceptance of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty in its present form‘180, a figure which just four days later had unaccountably 
increased to 98 per cent.
181
 Without giving any sources for obtaining such figures (such 
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as how many people were surveyed), along with the turn of phrase ‗it is probably true to 
say‘, the reliability of this account is questionable.  
    So why did the press sometimes exaggerate the amount of public support for the 
Treaty? One has to consider what the agreement meant for the press industry. Two major 
Irish newspaper titles, the Irish Independent and the Freeman’s Journal, had suffered 
IRA attacks on their premises (in December 1919 and March 1922 respectively) when 
they had printed material criticising the organisation. Meanwhile the editor of The Irish 
Times, John Edward Healy (who was a staunch Unionist), had had shots fired into his 
home by Republicans during the War of Independence.
182
 The personalities of the four 
men also likely accounted for which side the press aligned itself to. Arthur Griffith had 
begun his career in journalism and would therefore have retained personal contacts within 
the industry; Michael Collins meanwhile was approachable to the press, having given a 
number of interviews whilst on the run from the British. In comparison, de Valera had 
often spoken out against the press, and in the case of the IRA attacking the premises of 
the Irish Independent, this had happened whilst Cathal Brugha was Minister for Defence 
(thus making him responsible for the actions of the army). These factors would therefore 
have had a bearing on how these major newspaper titles reported events to their 
readerships - to support pro-Treaty forces would be a safer option than placing their faith 
in hard-line republicans, whose wrath they had experienced first-hand. 
    Despite the degree of bias in how the press reported the public‘s support for the Treaty, 
the fact remains that a majority of the general public was in favour. Such an opinion was 
voiced not just by those who were not strongly political, but also by self-confessed 
republicans. One journalist writing for the Donegal News (representing an Ulster 
province) reported the following: 
 
I have tried to obtain from Sinn Fein officials an accurate and impartial expression 
of the views of the members of their Clubs, and I have been assured by those who 
know exactly how the ―public pulse‖ is beating, that if a plebiscite were taken of 
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the Sinn Fein and other Nationalist electors in the county that NOT MORE THAN 
FIVE PER CENT would be found on the Anti-Ratificationist side.
183
 
 
Although the journalist‘s findings may have been slightly exaggerated, it is still clear that 
those opposed to the Treaty constituted the minority rather than the majority. Aside from 
written articles, attitudes towards the Treaty and the four politicians were also 
encapsulated in satirical cartoons, on both side of the Irish Sea: 
 
Figure 2: David Low, ‘The Joy-Jig-Jazz’, The Star (London, 8 December 1921). 
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This particular example was produced by the famous cartoonist David Low, published in 
the London newspaper The Star immediately after the signing of the Treaty. The 
implication that the author is ‗burning all the excellent cartoons he would have published 
if they hadn‘t made peace‘ implies that Low, like many, had not anticipated a successful 
outcome to the talks. As for an outsider‘s perspective of the Irish plenipotentiaries, the 
fact the illustration depicts Lloyd George with (solely) Collins rather than Griffith, 
suggests that from a British standpoint, it was the former who had played the decisive 
part in the talks. Aimed at a British readership, this particular cartoon reflects the 
optimism many expressed, believing that the centuries-old Irish question had now been 
laid to rest. Such optimism was not as abundant in Ireland, with reservations about the 
agreement apparent in the following cartoon:   
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Figure 3: Arthur Booth, ‘The Glittering Gates’, Dublin Opinion (1921). 
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Published in Dublin Opinion, this cartoon captures the three-way divide between de 
Valera, Collins and Griffith. Lloyd George is depicted coercing the men into the 
―glittering gates‖ of the Irish Free State, with mixed results. Griffith is shown to be gladly 
willing; Collins is more hesitant (given his links with the IRA and IRB, both staunchly 
republican organisations), whilst de Valera would rather risk ‗immediate and terrible 
war‘. Although Brugha is absent from the cartoon, had Booth decided to include the 
Minister for Defence, then one could surmise that he would be depicted also following 
the path of ‗immediate and terrible war‘, given his vocal readiness to suffer death for the 
cause of Irish freedom.
184
 
 
22) Observations 
 
The selection of newspaper articles documented here clearly shows that the press were 
almost unanimously supportive of the Treaty, implying to their readership that their 
approval was shared by a majority of Irishmen. In the period of the Treaty Debates, this 
did appear to be true, with a wave of organisations representing different interests groups 
within Irish society voicing their approval. On the other hand, when the electorate were 
given the chance six months later to voice their support for either pro- or anti-Treaty 
interests, although a majority were still in favour of the Treaty, the result was not as 
unanimous as press accounts suggested would be the case. Some republicans later argued 
that the shift in public opinion (in favour of the agreement) was essentially 
―manufactured‖ by the press.185 The benefit of hindsight suggests that public opinion was 
not manufactured by the press but was certainly exaggerated. Had a public vote taken 
place in January 1922, the wave of approval from different organisations suggests that the 
Treaty would have been approved by a very high margin. Although in the debates 
Brugha, as Minister for Defence, claimed that the IRA were in a stronger position than 
when the truce had come into effect, there was not wholesale public support for a renewal 
of hostilities. As Bill Kissane notes, ‗the peace enjoyed during the truce increased the 
gulf between public opinion and the elitist traditions of the IRA‘.186 However, on the eve 
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of civil war in June 1922, election results showed that public opinion on the Treaty was 
similarly split to those of de Valera, Collins, Griffith and Brugha.  This leads us to an 
important conclusion – internal conflict was not a direct result of the political split but 
was exasperated by the gulf between these four figures. There was enough discontent 
amongst certain sections of Irish society (especially members of militant groups such as 
the IRB and the IRA) with the Treaty, that even had the four individuals been less 
disjointed over the agreement, then there was still a cohort of Irishmen still willing to 
defend the Irish Republic at all costs and prevent the Irish Free State from gaining a 
foothold. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The focus of this research has been on Ireland‘s rocky path to independence in the period 
from the Easter Rising of 1916 to the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in January 
1922. In December 1921, agreement in London between Irish and British delegates had 
seemed to have resolved the centuries old ―Irish question‖. Instead, the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty ultimately brought war, not peace to the island. It divided the nationalist 
movement irrevocably and created such tensions that within just half a year of the 
Treaty‘s ratification, the country had been plunged into civil war. At the heart of this 
division were four figures – Eamon de Valera, Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith and 
Cathal Brugha. Their two-way split over the Treaty would subsequently be replicated by 
the opposing sides in the civil war – namely those in favour of the Irish Free State against 
those in support of the Irish Republic. The aim of this paper has been not only to 
understand why these leading Irish politicians of the day became so divided over the 
Treaty, but also to ascertain whether their views were concurrent with their fellow 
countrymen and played a part in sowing the seeds of civil war. 
    The research has drawn-up several findings. Firstly, each of these men initially had 
very opposing views regarding Ireland‘s future, contrasting with their later alliances in 
support (Collins and Griffith) and against the Treaty (de Valera and Brugha). The only 
shared consensus amongst the four was that Ireland should be a united, sovereign state. 
Aside from this, their views on how to achieve this goal, along with what form of 
governance the country should adopt, varied considerably. Such views were not just 
dependent on their own beliefs; world events were also critical. The Russian 
Revolution(s), coupled with the Allies‘ (purported) belief in the self-determination of 
individual peoples, suggested that the age of Imperialism was at an end. Even so, the 
British Empire (which reached its zenith in the period immediately after the First World 
War) retained its standing as one of the foremost global powers and thus the Irish still 
faced a formidable task in seeking independence. This was confirmed when de Valera 
met Lloyd George for preliminary negotiations in July 1921, although several examples 
have been cited whereby the president explored possibilities other than a republic before 
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the truce. For him, many of his decisions were influenced just as much by the need to 
keep moderates and hardliners united, as by his own personal political convictions. 
Griffith was one such moderate who de Valera was conscious of; having dropped his 
scheme for an Anglo-Irish dual monarchy in October 1917 (when his presidency of Sinn 
Féin was passed on to de Valera), he ended up signing an agreement much akin to his 
earlier proposal, albeit that the Treaty did not see Ireland become a coexisting kingdom 
alongside Great Britain. Collins meanwhile signed the Treaty in the belief that it would 
steer Ireland in the right direction towards eventual freedom. The ―gunman‖ who had 
been instrumental in the IRA‘s campaign of the War of Independence, was also resigned 
to the opinion that a renewed and prolonged war against the British would end 
unfavourably for the nation. The Treaty however would allow the country time to recover 
and provide room for further negotiations with the British and Northern Ireland 
governments at a later date (and indeed allow the strength of the IRA to be rebuilt if 
renewed conflict broke-out). These men‘s view sharply contrasted with those of hard-line 
republicans such as Cathal Brugha. For Brugha, all ties with the British Empire would 
have to be severed so as to guarantee true independence, even if this came at the cost of 
renewed conflict. Such a mindset was due not only to a personal willingness to sacrifice 
his own life for the republic; it was also born out of the belief that this republic had been 
ratified by the people in the election of 1918. To support the Treaty would therefore be a 
betrayal, not just of the people and their republic, but of the martyrs of 1916, whom he 
had fought alongside.  
 
23) The position of Eamon de Valera 
 
The position of de Valera regarding the nation‘s future was often obscured by his 
contradictory behavior; as Hopkinson observes: ‗De Valera‘s complex position was made 
the more difficult to understand by his tendency to cloak political compromise and 
ambiguity in the language of principle.‘187 This leads to another important finding, 
namely the difference between the private and public thoughts of each man. T. Dwyer 
claims that the president ‗tended to portray a moderate public image while privately 
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advocating a more hard-line approach‘.188 Evidence gathered here however contradicts 
this line of argument; his outward commitment to the republic was in contrast to his 
concealed willingness to stray from the republican path. Up until December 1921, he had 
used his presidency to act as a mediator between the different factions that made up Sinn 
Féin, helping to keep the coalition together. The Treaty however changed this; when his 
attempts to bridge the schism with his Document No. 2 failed, he took the anti-Treaty 
side. Debate has frequently focused on whether the president used the plenipotentiaries as 
scapegoats to safeguard his own position, or whether (as he personally argued) his duty 
was at home, keeping public opinion firm (along with all nationalist factions united) and 
the army organised, ready for renewed war if talks broke down.  Whereas evidence exists 
to suggest that de Valera knew well before the signing of the Treaty that a republic was 
not achievable (thus inferring that he used the delegates to secure his own position), this 
paper has also provided many examples of de Valera‘s suggestible commitment to the 
republic; even his entertaining of dominion status for Ireland. Although critics of de 
Valera could argue that such behaviour was used to political ends, it is more likely that it 
was born out of personal indecision. Acting as a mediator between moderates and 
hardliners, de Valera‘s own suggestions (such as Document No. 2 and the creat ion of an 
Anglo-Irish agreement akin to the U.S. Platt Amendment with Cuba) were often rebuked. 
Only once the Treaty had been signed did it become apparent where de Valera stood – he 
would continue to fight for the Irish Republic, even if this were at the cost of ‗renewed 
and terrible war‘. Yet instead of fighting the British, this war would be fought against 
fellow Irishmen. 
 
24) The position of Michael Collins 
 
Although history has served to depict Collins as unequivocally republican, such a 
depiction is not concurrent with the true political nature of the man. As Peter Hart 
comments, ‗despite his warlike image, he had never attached himself publicly to the full 
republican demand. In his speeches, his election addresses, his correspondence, even his 
interviews with the press, the word ‗republic‘ was almost completely absent‘.189 Collins‘ 
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signing of the Treaty came as a shock to many precisely because of this warlike image, 
and yet he now supported an agreement which effectively destroyed the republic many 
Irishmen had given their lives for. Some have argued that Collins was ―tainted‖ by the 
London atmosphere of the negotiations - that he was somehow duped into a compromise, 
which he defended with his stepping stone analogy. However evidence (notably the 
witness statement provided by Richard Walsh) suggests that long before the Treaty, 
Collins had envisaged Ireland taking not a single ―revolutionary‖ step to freedom, but 
rather a staggered approach. This is similar to his tactic during the War of Independence 
– secure freedom by making the country ungovernable, thus forcing the British either to 
withdraw or negotiate. Given the close working relationship between Collins and de 
Valera in the period before the truce (along with the latter‘s admittance that during the 
negotiations, he felt certain that Collins was contemplating accepting the Crown), one 
questions how well the president was aware of the minister‘s intensions.190 Although 
critics would once again use this as proof to suggest de Valera deliberately used Collins 
as a scapegoat, evidence has shown that Collins was susceptible to making public 
statements at odds with his private thoughts. As with de Valera, Collins was more 
politically suggestible than his outward stance implied.  
    The most important issue to remember with Collins is that he did not regard the Treaty 
as a final settlement, as outlined just before his death in August 1922: 
      
The freedom we have secured may unquestionably be incomplete. But it is the 
nearest approach to an absolutely independent and unified Ireland which we can 
achieve amongst ourselves at the present moment… Let us realise that the free 
Ireland obtained by the Treaty is the greatest common measure of freedom 
obtainable now, and the most pregnant for future development.
191
 
 
The intriguing aspect when looking at Collins during this period is his somewhat 
involuntary transformation from a rebel leader into a political negotiator. Having been 
instrumental in helping to spearhead the guerilla campaign against the British presence in 
Ireland during the War of Independence, he would then take on a decisive role in 
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negotiations with his former enemy. Although the Treaty would split Irish opinion, 
ultimately Collins‘ stepping-stone approach to independence would be the means 
employed to effect by de Valera in later years, culminating in the establishment of the 
Republic of Ireland (Éire) and withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1949. 
 
25) The position of Arthur Griffith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most experienced politician of all four men, Griffith was also the only figure not to 
have been directly involved in the Easter Rising. Possibly this can help to partially 
explain his moderate stance in comparison to the other three men, who had personally 
fought against the British on the streets of Dublin during that April week. Of more 
significance however was his 1904 publication The Resurrection of Hungary. Taking his 
inspiration from the Hungarian independence movement of the 1860s, Griffith advocated 
the establishment of an Anglo-Irish dual monarchy. This is not to imply that Griffith 
willfully opted to retain links with the British Empire, but it does show that he was 
inclined towards pragmatism rather than idealism. As he admitted during the Treaty 
Debates, he was not concerned with whether the symbolism of the Crown remained in 
Ireland, so long as the country was free to self-govern.
192
 His discarding of de Valera‘s 
Document No. 2 because of the mere ―quibble‖ of words he believed differentiated it 
from the signed agreement was in stark contrast to the opinions of the document‘s author 
and devout republicans such as Brugha, who were not so seemingly laissez-faire when it 
came to the issue of the Crown. The ideological gulf that separated Griffith‘s moderate 
stance from hard-line republicanism epitomised by Brugha was evident long before 
negotiations with the British commenced. This leads one to question why de Valera chose 
a moderate to chair the Irish delegation in London, being fully aware that Griffith 
regarded allegiance to the British Crown to be an acceptable part of any future 
agreement.
193
 Although critics of the president would once again suggest that he was 
using Griffith as a scapegoat (as has been suggested for Collins), this (again) ignores his 
tactical approach. As has been discussed, de Valera often sought to keep all factions 
within the Sinn Féin movement united; Griffith was the founder of this movement and 
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was a man of experience (in contrast to Collins). In addition, according to Robert Barton 
the president held more faith in Griffith‘s judgement as a negotiator in comparison to 
Collins.
194
 Although placing a moderate in charge of negotiating for a republic was a 
risky strategy, once has to recall de Valera‘s explicit instruction requiring the 
plenipotentiaries to submit any proposal to Dublin before signing, a commitment which 
was broken. In addition, during the Cabinet meeting of 3 December 1921, Griffith had 
personally assured de Valera that he would not sign any final agreement without referral 
back to Dublin, yet just three days later he and the other plenipotentiaries signed the 
Treaty without having consulted Dublin. Although this act did not officially commit 
Ireland to the agreement (it would first have to be ratified by the Dáil), one can see how 
rather than de Valera manipulating those around him, it was those very people who in 
fact misled the president.  
 
26) The position of Cathal Brugha 
 
 
Out of all the four politicians, Brugha remains the least-documented. Although material 
relating to his personal involvement in proceedings is less plentiful than of that relating to 
the other three figures, what is available does allow several conclusions to be drawn. 
Foremost, Brugha was the embodiment of hard-line Irish republicanism. Evidence here 
has shown that throughout the period analysed, Brugha resisted nearly all suggestions of 
compromise with the British. Whereas his willingness to sacrifice his own life for the 
republic could lead one to label him as a ―fanatic‖, one also has to be aware of his 
mindset. In January 1919 an Irish Republic had been proclaimed; to agree to a settlement 
that would dismantle this republic would in the eyes of Brugha be a gross betrayal.  Yet, 
Brugha did support de Valera‘s proposal for external association, in itself a compromise, 
for Ireland would still have partnered herself with the British Empire over issues of 
―common concern‖. Thus, to argue that the man was stubbornly committed to the 
republican ideal would be an incorrect assertion. So long as Ireland was a united, 
sovereign nation, he would be acceptant (albeit begrudgingly) of retaining links with the 
British Empire, so long as the latter did not infringe upon Ireland‘s right to self-
governance.   
                                               
194 Barton, ―Document W.S. 979‖, pp. 38-39.  
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27) The attitudes of the four figures regarding the issues of sovereignty and     
       Ulster 
 
 
The main issue of contention between the men would be over the issue of sovereignty, in 
particular allegiance to the British Crown. This divide, along with the absence of a firm 
policy on how to resolve the issue of Ulster, would arguably have the greatest impact on 
the future of Ireland and provide the catalyst for civil war. The fact that the four 
individuals were split down the middle over the issue of the British Crown meant that 
whatever decision was reached over the Treaty, the decision would be contentious, as 
was proved when it was passed by a slim majority of just seven votes. De Valera tried to 
avoid such a situation arising with his proposal of external association, which he wrongly 
believed extreme republicans in his Cabinet would accept (even though Brugha himself 
was acceptant of it).
195
 Griffith at one point during the Treaty Debates belittled the 
―quibble‖ of words that divided the Treaty and Document No. 2, but as Peter Hart notes, 
the issue was not just symbolic. ‗At stake were the fundamental nature of the Irish 
constitution, the source of governmental authority (the people or the king), the 
relationship with Britain (equal or subordinate) and, in concrete political terms, the 
survival of the republican movement and the prospect of civil war.‘196 
    Equally crucial to Ireland‘s future was the approach taken to the issue of Ulster. By the 
time negotiations commenced with the British, the island had been partitioned and the 
task now facing the men was not just for independence, but also for reunification. Despite 
the importance of the issue of Ulster, it is surprising to observe how this was not the 
primary focus of the four individuals. Instead it would be sovereignty rather than unity – 
the oath rather than partition – that emerged as the divisive issue.197 Whereas in public 
the men spoke of the importance of ―essential unity‖, they failed to assert themselves 
over this key requisite during the negotiations, epitomised by de Valera‘s delay in 
sending the plenipotentiaries the Cabinet‘s official stand on the Northern issue. None of 
the four men failed to recognise the clear religious and cultural differences between north 
and south, yet they did not share a collective approach to the problem. Whereas Brugha‘s 
                                               
195 Mary C. Bromage, ‗De Valera‘s Formula for Irish Nationhood‘, The Review of Politics, 13 (1951), 483-
502 (490). 
196 Hart, Mick: The Real Michael Collins, pp. 310-311. 
197 Roy Douglas, Liam Harte and Jim O‘Hara (eds.), Drawing Conclusions: A Cartoon History of Anglo-
Irish Relations 1798-1998 (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1998), p. 179.  
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thoughts are not readily documented, in the case of de Valera he was open to allowing for 
an autonomous Northern Ireland, so long as it was ultimately answerable to Dublin and 
not Westminster.  
Collins and Griffith on the other hand believed that economic pressures upon the North 
would lead to reunification. This was born out of a (ultimately misguided) trust in the 
findings of a future boundary commission, which they believed would transfer the 
predominantly nationalist and catholic areas of Northern Ireland to the Irish Free State, 
leaving the former too small to remain isolated from the rest of the country in the long 
run. In the end the boundary remained unaltered and ninety years later, the Six Counties 
remain divided from the rest of Ireland.  
 
28) Final observations 
 
 
If one were to take either de Valera, Collins, Griffith or Brugha out of the equation, then 
the course of events during this part of Irish history would have been very different. Each 
man represented differing factions within Sinn Féin – Griffith stood for moderates, 
Collins was a man of the IRA and the IRB and Brugha championed the position of hard-
line republicans. Meanwhile de Valera, who commanded a loyal following and respect 
from those around him (including from the three other men) stood for an external Irish 
Republic, sharing retained links with the British Empire. Although there were many other 
Irish politicians of the day who had a critical bearing on events, ultimately it was these 
four figures that had the largest impact. Their influence was as much about their personal 
standing as their political stances; Tom Hales (the man in charge of the anti-Treaty IRA 
unit that assassinated Collins) later said: ‗If Dev had come back with a document that 
Collins didn‘t like, there‘d have been no civil war.‘198 These personal standings have 
already been the focus of much debate, particularly in regards to de Valera and Collins. 
In the case of de Valera, some writers (for instance the journalist Tim Pat Coogan) have 
argued that he manipulated those around him, especially Collins, so as to secure his own 
political position. This paper argues otherwise, noting that the president‘s absence from 
the negotiations was a logical safeguard to Ireland‘s position (the need to refer any 
decisions back to Dublin before approval would avoid any hasty decisions being made), 
                                               
198 Coogan, Michael Collins: A Biography, pp. 318-319. 
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but that miscommunication and misunderstanding compromised this tactic. As for 
Collins, although he has often been portrayed as the archetypal republican, evidence here 
has indicated that he, along with de Valera, outwardly portrayed themselves as committed 
to the Irish Republic, whilst privately being a lot more politically suggestible. The 
positions of Griffith and Brugha meanwhile are more straight forward; the former was 
openly a moderate and the latter openly a hard-line republican. Even so, the personal 
standing of de Valera was such that he was able to convince Griffith to place his party 
onto a republican footing and to convince Brugha to accept the principle of external 
association (even though it was a compromise). Despite the later joint alliances formed 
between the men over the Treaty (namely Collins and Griffith in favour, with de Valera 
and Brugha against), this belies the very individual and opposing views held by each of 
them. Insomuch as they marched together under the banner of Sinn Féin, their viewpoints 
ranged from strict republicanism to a willingness to accept dominion status for Ireland.
199
  
    As to the question of whether the two-way split of these four individuals over the 
Treaty directly led to the civil war, this paper concludes that whereas it provided a 
catalyst for internal strife, it was not the sole cause. The Treaty confronted ordinary 
Irishmen with a stark choice - either they could choose to fight on for the Irish Republic, 
or they could accept the Treaty and therefore partition and allegiance to the British 
Empire. This choice however did not arise from the Treaty itself; it had been first put 
forward to the electorate in the 1918 election, when they were given the choice of voting 
for an independent Irish Republic or for the island (as this stage still one entity) to remain 
part of the United Kingdom, albeit with greater autonomy (i.e. Home Rule). At this stage 
the Irish people voted categorically in favour of Sinn Féin and their mandate for a 
republic, but as has been noted this result may also have resulted from public 
dissatisfaction with the British and previous (Irish) attempts to gain more autonomy, 
rather than a specific desire for an Irish Republic per se. By the time of the June 1922 
election, the results showed a much more divided nation.  Parties supporting the Treaty 
still received a majority share of the vote, but it was not unanimous and indeed could not 
prevent civil unrest breaking out just a few weeks, resulting in a war bloodier than that 
had consumed the country in the period 1919-1921. This turn-around in public opinion 
                                               
199 Akenson, ―Was De Valera a Republican?‖, p. 233 
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(in which the majority now voiced their support for a non-republican Irish state) was no 
doubt influenced by the political divide that emerged between the four individuals but it 
was not created by the schism. The destruction of the War of Independence and the threat 
of a renewal of hostilities would have weighed on the minds of many when considering 
the Treaty. Ultimately the question confronting Irishmen was a simple one – what would 
offer them a better future, the Irish Republic or the Irish Free State? In the end the latter 
choice won out but dreams of a republic did not disappear and in 1949 Ireland finally 
became a republic, albeit still partitioned from Northern Ireland, a situation which to this 
very day continues to bring violence to the island. 
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